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TELEMARKETING, COMMERCIAL SPEECH,
AND CENTRAL HUDSON: POTENTIAL FIRST
AMENDMENT PROBLEMS FOR INDIANA
CODE SECTION 24-4.7 AND OTHER "DO-NOT-
CALL" LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Which do Americans hate more: Osama Bin Laden or telemarketers?
Regardless of the answer, www.antitelemarketer.com, a website devoted
to combating the telemarketing industry, recently displayed a fabricated
video depiction of Osama Bin Laden being tortured by the United States'
most powerful weapon against the answering machine-less Taliban:
telemarketers.1 As punishment for refusing to turn over Bin Laden, a
Taliban official, looking suspiciously like Osama himself, is subjected to
endless telephone calls made by solicitors of aluminum siding, credit
cards, cable television, and long distance services.2
Amusement aside, telemarketing has become both big business and
a big problem in the United States. In 1999, nearly 5.5 million Americans
I http://www.antitelemarketer.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2002). The website promotes
itself as "[tihe web's #1 source for stopping unwanted telephone sales calls." Id.
Telemarketing is defined as "the selling or promoting of goods and services by telephone."
ENCARTA WORLD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1833 (1999).




[AGENT JOHNSON]: Yes, this is Agent Johnson of the U.S. F.B.I. My President has
instructed me to ask you for the final time to turn over the person or location of one Osama
Bin Laden for his actions against our country or you must face the consequences...
[MR. TALIBANI: We do not fear your weapons. We have anti-aircraft, and anti-tank, and
anti-missile and weaponry.
[AGENT JOHNSON]: We know that, but you don't have answering machines.
[MR. TALIBAN]: What?
[AGENT JOHNSON]: Will you give us Bin Laden?
[MR. TALIBAN]: No!
[AGENT JOHNSON]: O.K., you asked for it. (CLICK)
[MR. TALIBAN]: Answering machine? What is that?
(PHONE RINGING)
[MR. TALIBAN]: Taliban.
[UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE TELEMARKETER]: Hello, how are you this afternoon? Would
you like better rates on your long distance service? (Mr. Taliban is then subjected to an
endless barrage of telemarketing calls).
Id.
347
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were employed in the telemarketing industry, and over five hundred
and forty billion dollars were earned through telephone solicitations.3
Recent estimates report that the ten largest telemarketing firms in the
country are able to make five hundred and sixty calls per second.4 At
that rate, these telemarketers alone are able to make "33,600 calls a
minute; 2,016,000 calls per hour; 16,128,000 per eight-hour day;
80,640,000 per five-day week; or enough to call every phone number in
the United States, some several times over-each and every month."5
Whether due to the frequency with which telemarketing calls are
received, or the irritating nature of the calls themselves, Americans have
come to hate telemarketers. 6  One recent commentator described
telemarketing calls as "a scourge of American life, . . . a rare object of
loathing that cuts across gender, class, and culture." 7 As a result of this
disdain for telephone solicitations, increasing numbers of state residents
are becoming fed up with the nightly annoyance of unwanted
telemarketing calls.8 They are also demanding that their legislators do
something about it.9
The most recent response to the telemarketing problem has been the
advent of "do-not-call" statutes. 10 These statutes allow state residents to
signal their desire to receive no telemarketing calls by having their
names and telephone numbers placed on a list or database maintained
by the state." The list is then purchased by or provided to telemarketers
3 Craig Savoye, States Spare Residents from Telemarketers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec.
22, 2000, at 2, available at 2000 WL 4433175.
4 Fred Kaplan, Demands for Privacy Curb Telemarketers, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2000, at
Al, available at 2000 WL 3356952.
5 Id.
6 See Stuart A. Hirsch, 'Phone Rage,' Good Business Collide in Telemarketing Bill,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 19, 2000, at Al (reporting the observations of one telephone
consumer who stated that telemarketers made her "furious" and that telemarketing
represents "a gross invasion of privacy"); Telemarketing Bill is Small, Welcome Step,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 2, 2001, at A16 [hereinafter Telemarketing Bill].
7 Kaplan, supra note 4, at Al.
8 See Telemarketing Bill, supra note 6, at A16. When asked to rank the importance of
twenty-four issues pending before the Indiana General Assembly in the 2001 legislative
session, Hoosiers ranked telemarketing as their second biggest concern. Id.
9 Id.
10 See Jerry Markon, Take Me Off Your List! (Pretty Please?), STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St.
Paul), Dec. 27, 2000, at 1D, available at 2000 WL 7003353.
1 See, e.g., TENN CODE ANN. § 65-4-405(a) (Supp. 2001). The statute provides that "[tlhe
[Tennessee regulatory] authority shall establish and provide for the operation of a database
to compile a list of telephone numbers of residential subscribers who object to receiving
telephone solicitations." Id.
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doing business in the state.12 Telemarketers who thereafter call numbers
appearing on the lists face potentially serious civil or even criminal
penalties. 13
"Do-not-call" statutes have become the legislative rage. At least
seventeen states, including Indiana, have enacted such statutes within
the past few years, and many more states are currently considering "do-
not-call" bills as legislators rush to garner credit for providing relief to
their constituents. 14 However, because of statutory exemptions for
various types of calls, the relief expected and the relief delivered by "do-
not-call" statutes are often two different things.15 Due to heavy lobbying
by various trade industries, state legislatures have included exemptions
in the statutes for telemarketing calls made by car dealers, banks, funeral
homes, and many other types of businesses.16 Indiana's new "do-not-
call" law excludes, among others, telemarketing calls made by charitable
organizations, real estate agents, insurance agents, and those soliciting
the sale of newspapers.17
Arguably, this is not the type of protection, state telephone
consumers want from their legislatures: "do-not-call" statutes that still
allow telemarketing calls to be placed to their homes, disturbing their
privacy. However, this also may not be the type of protection required
by the Constitution. Given the United States Supreme Court's increased
protection of commercial speech in its recent interpretations of Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 18
12 See id. § 65-4-405(d)(1) ("A person or entity desiring to make telephone solicitations to
any residential subscriber shall pay to the authority ... an annual registration fee of five
hundred dollars to defray regulatory and enforcement expenses.").
13 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.059(8) (West Supp. 2001) (prescribing a maximum
$10,000 penalty); IDAHO CODE § 48-1003A(3) (Michie Supp. 2001) (allowing penalties up to
$5,000 for multiple violations); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.7-5-2 (West Supp. 2001) (authorizing
civil penalties of $10,000 for first-time violations and $25,000 for subsequent violations of
the "do-not-call" provisions); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.46999 (Banks-Baldwin 2001)
(providing criminal penalties for violation of its "do-not-call" statute).
14 See infra Part IV.A (listing the existing state "do-not-call" statutes and discussing the
"do-not-call" phenomenon).
15 See infra Part IV.B (discussing exemptions placed within the statutes).
16 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §4-99-406 (Michie Supp. 2001); see also infra notes 290-91 and
accompanying text (noting the effect of lobbying on "do-not-call" statutes).
17 IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.7-1-1.
18 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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potential First Amendment concerns are raised by statutes that have an
insufficient connection between their legislative means and end.' 9
This Note argues that state legislatures, in drafting "do-not-call"
statutes, have underestimated the value the Court places on commercial
speech and have failed to appreciate the manner in which the Court has
interpreted Central Hudson in recent years.20 Specifically, this Note
suggests that state legislatures that have enacted "do-not-call" statutes
should re-think the exemptions placed within them and those
considering such legislation should draft their statutes with care. To this
end, Part II of this Note provides the legal background of the Court's
commercial speech doctrine. 21  Part III discusses prior attempts to
regulate the telemarketing industry and the constitutionality of those
efforts. 22 Part IV then describes the "do-not-call" phenomenon and the
exemption problem before analyzing the constitutionality of "do-not-
call" legislation enacted to date in terms of the exemptions in the
statutes.23 Particular attention is paid in this section to Indiana's "do-
not-call" statute.24 Finally, Part V proposes a model statute for state
legislatures so they might avoid the exemption problem when drafting
"do-not-call" statutes.25
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. The Early Position: No Protection for Commercial Speech
The First Amendment's protections of speech initially appear quite
sweeping. 26  Written in absolute terms, the amendment seems to
19 See infra Part IV.D (discussing First Amendment concerns raised by "do-not-call"
statutes). Central Hudson provides a four-part test used to evaluate the constitutionality of
commercial speech restrictions. See infra Part II.C.
20 See infra Part II.D (discussing the recent application of Central Hudson).
21 See infra Part II.
22 See infra Part III.
23 See infra Part IV.
24 See infra Part IV.C.
25 See infra Part V.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " Id. While part of the United States
Constitution, the protections of the First Amendment have been incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925). The Court in Gitlow held,
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech
and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2002], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss1/6
2002] "DO-NOT-CALL" 351
preclude the government from statutorily abridging the speech of its
citizens in any fashion. 27 Yet such an extreme position clearly is
untenable, for as Justice Holmes aptly stated, even "[tihe most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire
in a theatre and causing a panic." 28 Once it is accepted that all speech is
not automatically immunized under the First Amendment, line-drawing
by the government becomes inevitable. 29 Courts must attempt to balance
governmental interests against the intrusion on speech to determine
whether, in light of the purposes of protecting speech, the First
Amendment can tolerate the encroachment. 30
and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States.
Id.
27 U.S. CONST. amend I. Indeed, not only novices, but some scholars in constitutional
law, view the amendment's commands as being literal. Justice Black, perhaps the chief
defender of the absolutist position, argued that "[t]he phrase 'Congress shall make no law'
is composed of plain words, easily understood .... [T]he Framers themselves did [the
necessary] balancing when they wrote [the First Amendment] .... Courts have neither the
right nor the power.., to make a different [judgment]." Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874, 879 (1960). For an interesting discussion concerning the viability of
Justice Black's absolutist position, see Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme
Court, and the Bill of Rights, HARPER'S, Feb. 1961, at 63-68.
28 Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
29 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 895 (2d ed.
2002).
30 Cf. Schenk, 249 U.S. at 52 (suggesting that a case-by-case analysis must be undertaken
with restrictions on speech considering, among other things, the context of the speech and
the governmental interest at stake). Although there are many different views of why the
Framers sought to protect speech, perhaps none has been expressed as eloquently as that of
Justice Brandeis who stated that
[The Framers] believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak
as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is
a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). It is widely
understood that the First Amendment was at least meant to abolish the restrictions on
publication without approval of the Crown that existed in England. CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 29, at 892. However, discerning the true legislative intent of the First Amendment is
complicated in that many of those involved in drafting and ratifying the amendment later
adopted the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Id. at 894. These laws allowed prosecution
for publishing statements critical of the government and were widely used by the
Federalists against rival Republicans. Id.
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Thus, with no clear direction from the Framers, the United States
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has developed on a
case-by-case basis. In this process, the Court has created a hierarchy of
speech, determining that certain speech is more essential to the
continued existence of a democracy and, thus, deserving of greater
protection under the First Amendment.31  At the pinnacle of this
hierarchy, and, therefore, subject to little regulation, is political speech.32
Occupying the lowest position in the hierarchy are the types of speech
designated by the Court as being "unprotected." 33 Speech that is
"unprotected" includes language that incites illegal activity, speech
falling under the classification of "fighting words," and obscene forms of
communication. 34 Because the Court finds such forms of communication
to be of little or no value, the government may essentially regulate such
speech freely.35 Occupying the middle of the Court's hierarchy is speech
that, while not unprotected, is less protected than speech considered to
31 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, White, & Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring).
32 Id. Judge Learned Hand, explaining the justification for such protection of political
speech, stated that the First Amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative
selection. To many this is, and will always be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all."
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). Elaborating on
Judge Hand's averment, the Court later stated that "[in light of] a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open ... [such debate] may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on the government and public officials." N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
33 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 422.
34 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (stating that it "has been categorically
settled ... that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment"); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (affirming defendant's conviction for using words
"likely to provoke the average person to retaliation"); Schenk, 249 U.S. at 52-53 (affirming
convictions of defendants advocating the illegal activity of resisting the draft).
35 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. The Court stated,
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem .... It has been well observed that
such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to the truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality.
Id. But see R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383-84 (holding that even among categories of unprotected
speech, government may not improperly make content-based distinctions by proscribing
only limited types of unprotected speech).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2002], Art. 6
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have higher value.36 Falling into this middle category of lesser-protected
speech is speech that, although not obscene, is sexually explicit and
speech that is commercial in nature.37
Like many areas of its jurisprudence, the Court's commercial speech
doctrine has undergone a metamorphosis since its inception. The
starting point for examining the Court's approach to commercial speech
is Valentine v. Christenson.38 In Valentine, F.J. Christenson, owner of a
retired United States Navy submarine to which he intended to sell
admission tickets, sought to enjoin New York City Police Commissioner,
Lewis Valentine, from enforcing an ordinance forbidding the
distribution of handbills of a commercial or business nature.39 Valentine
required the Court to address squarely whether regulation of
commercial advertising represented an abridgement of rights guaranteed
by the First Amendment.40 In a brief opinion, devoid of analysis,
explanation, or citation to any authority, a unanimous Court held that
the First Amendment afforded no protection to commercial speech.41
36 R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 422 (explaining that commercial speech and pornographic speech
are forms of "second-class expression").
37 Id. Commercial speech has been defined by the Court as having three characteristics:
(1) the speech is an advertisement of some kind; (2) the speech refers to a specific product;
and (3) the speaker has an economic motive for the speech. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). The core notion of commercial speech is that it "[does] no
more than propose a commercial transaction." Id. at 67 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
3 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
39 Id. at 52-53. Christenson's handbills merely solicited visitors to view the submarine at
a pier where it was moored. Id. Upon being told that handbills devoted solely to public
information or protest were not prohibited by the ordinance, Christenson had double sided
handbills prepared. Id. at 53. One side of the reprinted handbills retained the commercial
advertisement, minus any mention of the admission fee, while the reverse side contained a
statement of protest against the city's dock department for denying him wharf facilities for
exhibition purposes. Id. The police advised Christenson that all commercial advertising
would need to be eliminated for the handbills to be lawful; however, he distributed the
reprinted handbills despite this warning and was restrained by police. Id.
40 Id. at 54.
41 Id. (stating that, while government may usually not unduly burden public
thoroughfares in regard to information of public interest, "the Constitution imposes no
such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising"). Despite this
initial lack of protection for commercial speech by the Court, it is apparent that advertising
has been a central part of American culture from the very beginning of its history. See
generally DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 328 (1958);
JAMES PLAYSTED WOOD, THE STORY OF ADVERTISING 45-69 (1958) (describing the
widespread use of advertising in colonial America). Boorstin quotes Isaiah Thomas, a
colonial printer, as saying that "[advertisements] are well calculated to enlarge and
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The Court perpetuated this lack of protection for commercial speech
when it decided Breard v. City of Alexandria.42 In Breard, a magazine
salesman was convicted of violating an Alexandria, Louisiana, ordinance
that made it unlawful to solicit door-to-door.4 3 The Supreme Court of
Louisiana upheld Breard's conviction, emphasizing the city's purpose of
enlighten the public mind, and are worthy of being enumerated among the many methods
of awakening and maintaining the popular attention, with which more modem times,
beyond all preceding example, abound." BOORSTIN, supra, at 328. In fact, commercial
advertisements played such a formative role in colonial America that Benjamin Franklin
authored an early defense of a free press in support of his unpopular decision to print an
advertisement for a voyage to Barbados. Benjamin Franklin, An Apology for Printers, June
10, 1731, reprinted in BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 32-37 (Carl Van
Doren ed., 1945); see also 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495-96 (1996) (making
this observation regarding Franklin).
42 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
43 Id. at 624. The ordinance in part provided as follows:
'An ordinance regulating solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant
merchants or transient vendors of merchandise in the city of
Alexandria, Louisiana; declaring it to be a nuisance for those engaging
in such pursuits to go in or upon private residences without having
been requested or invited to do so; providing penalties for the
violation hereof; repealing all ordinances in conflict herewith.
'Section 1. Be it ordained by the council of the city of Alexandria,
Louisiana, in legal session convened that the practice of going in and
upon private residences in the City of Alexandria, Louisiana by
solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors
of merchandise not having been requested or invited so to do by the
owner or owners, occupant or occupants of said private residences for
the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares and
merchandise and/or disposing of and/or peddling or hawking the
same is declared to be a nuisance and punishable as such nuisance as a
misdemeanor.
'Section 2. Be it further ordained, etc., that any person violating the
provisions of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be fined not
more than $100.00 or imprisoned not more than 30 days or both fined
and imprisoned in the discretion of the Court.
'Section 3. Be it further ordained, etc., that the provisions of this
ordinance shall not apply to the sale, or soliciting of orders for the sale,
of milk, dairy products, vegetables, poultry, eggs and other farm and
garden produce so far as the sale of the commodities named herein is
now authorized by law....'
City of Alexandria v. Breard, 47 So. 2d 553, 554-55 (La. 1950). This type of ordinance was
known as a Green River ordinance, after the town of Green River, Wyoming, which first
attempted to address the problems associated with door-to-door sales in 1931. Breard, 341
U.S. at 627-28. The ordinance was challenged on multiple occasions by the Fuller Brush
Company as were similar ordinances in many other states. Id. at 628-29. The results of
these challenges were detailed by the Court in Breard. Id. at 627-28 n.6.
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protecting the privacy of its residents.44 In pleading his case to the
United States Supreme Court, Breard alleged, inter alia, that the
ordinance improperly infringed on his freedom of speech.45 The Court
first considered the developing problems posed by the increased use of
door-to-door sales before upholding the ordinance against Due Process
and Commerce Clause challenges.46
Turning to a First Amendment analysis, the Court initially agreed
that the selling of magazines implicated the amendment.47 However, the
Court held that, because only the selling of the publications was at issue,
the speech was commercial in nature and, therefore, could be regulated
by communities offended by the sales practices.48 Thus, although the
Breard, 47 So. 2d at 557. Emphasizing privacy rights, the Louisiana Supreme Court
stated that "[a] salient feature of this case ... is that, transcendent over the rights which
appellant claims are infringed by the ordinance, is a fundamental principle of the law-a
man's home is his castle. No one has any vested prerogative to invade another's privacy."
Id. at 556.
45 Breard, 341 U.S. at 625. Breard also argued that the ordinance violated his rights to
due process and that it was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Id.
46 Id. at 626-27, 633, 640. The Court stated that such methods "are a nuisance, or worse
to peace and quiet" and that "responsible municipal officers have sought a way to curb the
annoyances while preserving complete freedom for desirable visitors to the homes." Id. at
627. In upholding the ordinance against these initial arguments, the Court's concern for
privacy was unmistakable. The Court stated,
Great as is the value of exposing citizens to novel views, home is the
place where a man ought to be able to shut himself up in his own ideas
if he desires. There he should be free not only from unreasonable
searches and seizures but also from hearing uninvited strangers
expound distasteful doctrines. A doorbell cannot be disregarded like a
handbill. It takes several minutes to ascertain the purpose of the
propagandist and at least several more to get rid of him ....
Id. at 640 n.27 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 406
(1941)).
47 Id. at 641. However, the Court noted that "[o]nly the press or oral advocates of ideas
could urge this point. It was not open to the solicitors for gadgets or brushes." Id. It is
interesting to note that even the great defender of the First Amendment, Justice Black,
although dissenting in Breard, would have upheld the ordinance if it were applied against a
common merchant selling pots and pans door-to-door rather than a salesman of
magazines. Id. at 650 n.* (Black, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 642, 645 ("It would be ... a misuse of the great guarantees of free speech and free
press to use those guarantees to force a community to admit the solicitors of publications to
the home premises of its residents."). In upholding the ordinance, the Breard Court was
forced to distinguish Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), which had invalidated a
similar ordinance enacted by the City of Struthers, Ohio, as applied to the distribution of
religious tracts. Id. at 642-43. Noting that commercial speech was not at issue in Martin,
the Breard Court felt the two opinions were "not necessarily inconsistent." Id. at 643.
Therefore, the Court clearly signaled that otherwise protected speech could be targeted for
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"marketplace of ideas" was becoming a revered concept within the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, the actual marketplace of daily
commerce was thought to be outside the amendment's protections. 49
B. The Change in Position: Protection for Commercial Speech
Commercial speech remained unprotected by the First Amendment
after Breard until 1975, when the Court decided Bigelow v. Virginia.50 At
issue in Bigelow was a Virginia statute that made it unlawful to
encourage the procuring of an abortion through the use of
advertisements.5 1 Bigelow, a newspaper editor, ran an advertisement in
his Virginia newspaper soliciting abortion services in New York and was
convicted of violating the statute.5 2 The Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld the conviction, relying on the Court's withholding of First
Amendment protection to commercial speech in Valentine.5 3 The Court,
in reversing, held that "speech is not stripped of First Amendment
protection merely because it appears [in commercial] form."54 The Court
distinguished Valentine's holding as being limited and reasoned that,
where an advertisement contains material of public interest and,
therefore, does more than simply propose a commercial transaction, First
Amendment protections should apply.55 The Court explained that
restrictions by government precisely because of its commercial nature. Martin H. Redish,
The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression,
39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429,453 (1971).
49 Id. at 429. The marketplace of ideas was one of Justice Holmes' most famous
analogies, first appearing in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 897. Arguing that
truth emerges from the testing of an idea against competing notions, Holmes stated that
"the ultimate good ... is better reached by free trade [of] ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
50 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
51 Id. at 812-13. The statute was originally enacted in 1878, and Bigelow's prosecution
was possibly the first under the statute. Id. at 813 n.2.
52 Id. at 811-14.
53 Id. at 814, 819.
54 Id. at 818. The Court suggested that its precedents, decided since Valentine, supported
this holding. Id. at 820 (noting the decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964)).
55 Id. at 819, 822. Justice Blackmun, who penned the majority opinion, explained that
Valentine's application to a particular handbill "does not [provide authority] for the
proposition that all statutes regulating commercial advertising are immune to
constitutional challenge." Id. at 819-20. In fact, it was noted that Justice Douglas, a member
of the Court at the time Valentine was decided, felt the Court's decision in that case was
"casual, almost offhand ... [a]nd [that] it ha[d] not survived reflection." Id. at 820 n.6.
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commercial speech is not automatically devoid of value simply because
of its economic nature.5 6 Rather, in determining the extent to which First
Amendment protections should apply to commercial speech, the Court
reasoned that the First Amendment interests at stake were to be balanced
against the strength of the public interest in regulating the speech.5 7
Emphasizing that the advertisement at issue contained information of
public interest, the Court held that the Virginia statute was
unconstitutional as applied to Bigelow's advertisement.5 8
While Bigelow concerned the protection of commercial speech that
was of public interest, the following year, in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,59 the Court was
asked to determine whether purely commercial speech was wholly
outside the First Amendment's protections. 60 At issue was a Virginia
statute that prohibited pharmacists from advertising the prices of
prescription medications. 61  This statute was challenged, not by
pharmacists subject to the statute's provisions, but by users of
prescription medications. 62 Their claim was that the First Amendment
prohibited the government from disrupting the flow of information from
5 Id. at 826 ("The relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services
does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.").
57 Id.
58 Id. at 822, 829. The Court's decision to extend First Amendment guarantees to
commercial speech sparked debate among legal scholars as to whether economically
motivated speech is deserving of such protection. Critics assert that the First Amendment
protects only limited values such as self-government and individual expression, neither of
which is implicated by commercial speech. Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr.,
Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979).
The Court's retreat from the commercial speech exception has even been likened to a return
to the economic due process of the Lochner era. Id. at 30. But see Sylvia A. Law, Addiction,
Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 909, 932 (1992) (suggesting that denying First
Amendment protection to commercial speech "reinforces a narrow vision of First
Amendment values" and focuses primarily on political speech while ignoring the wider
range of human expression the amendment was designed to protect). Other supporters of
commercial speech protection focus on its informational value. See generally Redish, supra
note 48. Redish suggests that only through exposure to competing commercial ideas do
consumers receive the information needed to achieve the greatest degree of personal
satisfaction allowed by their resources. Id. at 433.
59 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
60 Id. at 760-61 (acknowledging that Bigelow had left a "fragment of hope" for the
commercial speech exception to First Amendment protections but finding the issue
squarely before the Court in the case at bar).
61 Id. at 749-50.
62 Id. at 753. This raised a standing issue; however, the Court declared that, when the
First Amendment was implicated, "the protection afforded is to the communication, to its
source and to its recipients both." Id. at 756.
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pharmacists willing to provide the information to consumers who
wished to receive it.63
The Court's opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, initially observed
that whether or not the speaker's primary motivation was economic was
irrelevant for the First Amendment claim.64 Thereafter, Justice Blackmun
stressed the importance of commercial speech to society. 65 He suggested
that the consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information
may be "keener by far" than similar interest in current political debate.
66
Furthermore, the Court found that society in general had a strong public
interest in maintaining the free flow of commercial information,
explaining that
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it
sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of
information as to who is producing and selling what
product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as
we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy,
the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It
is a matter of public interest that these decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is indispensable
.... Therefore, even if the First Amendment were
thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten
public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say
that the free flow of information does not serve that
goal.
67
Weighing the asserted state interests in maintaining a high degree of
professionalism and the protection of its citizens against these First
Amendment concerns, the Court invalidated the Virginia statute.68
While the Court's decision in Virginia State Board was the strongest
expression yet of First Amendment protection for commercial speech, it
6 Id. at 754.
6 Id. at 762 (noting that speech in labor disputes had been provided First Amendment
protection despite the economic motivation of the parties).
65 Id. at 763-66.
6 Id. at 763.
67 Id. at 765 (footnotes omitted).
6 Id. at 766-70.
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did little more than Bigelow in providing guidance to state legislatures on
the limits to which such speech could be regulated. 69 In Virginia State
Board, the Court merely observed that, despite its holding, some forms of
commercial speech regulation were still permissible, such as time, place,
or manner restrictions and prohibitions on advertising that is false or
misleading.70 It was not until 1980, when the Court decided Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,7 that a test was
articulated for measuring governmental restrictions on commercial
speech.
C. Evaluating Restrictions on Commercial Speech
In Central Hudson, the source of contention was a regulation of the
Public Service Commission of the State of New York that completely
prohibited any promotional advertising by electrical utility companies. 72
Central Hudson, a utility company, challenged this regulation as an
unconstitutional restriction on speech.73 The Supreme Court's appraisal
of the dispute was prefaced by acknowledging that its precedents had
both recognized the value of commercial speech in society as well as
consistently affirmed its lowered hierarchical position. 74 The Court also
69 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 (1975). Bigelow had expressly left the question
unanswered, stating, "We need not decide in this case the precise extent to which the First
Amendment permits regulation of advertising that is related to activities the State may
legitimately regulate or even prohibit." Id.
70 Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 770-71. The time, place, or manner test for restrictions on
speech requires that such restrictions be justifiable without reference to the content of the
regulated speech; that the restrictions be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest; and that they leave ample alternative channels of communication
open to the information regulated. See id. at 771; Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
71 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
72 Id. at 558. The ban on advertising was justified by the Public Service Commission on
the grounds that promotional advertising by electric companies was contrary to a national
policy of conservation encouraged due to an existing energy shortage. Id. at 559-60.
Electric utilities were allowed to continue "informational" advertising designed to shift
user consumption of electricity to off-peak hours. Id. at 560.
73 Id. The order of the trial court affirming the commission's order was upheld by the
New York Court of Appeals. Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 390 N.E.2d 749,
758 (N.Y. 1979). Noting that advertising by a utility company operating a monopoly was
unnecessary, especially during an energy crisis, the court of appeals found that the
governmental interest in prohibiting the speech outweighed the speech's limited
constitutional value. Id. at 757-58.
74 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63 (stating that, although "we have rejected the 'highly
paternalistic' view that government has complete power to suppress or regulate
commercial speech[,] ... our decisions have recognized the 'commonsense' distinction
between speech proposing a commercial transaction ... and other varieties of speech").
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confirmed that the level of protection afforded to commercial speech was
dependant upon a balancing of the nature of the expression and the
interests asserted by government in regulating it.75
The majority opinion, written by Justice Powell, attempted to give
meaning to the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence by describing a
four-part test based on principles extracted from its prior cases.76 The
Court held that the initial inquiry should be whether the restrictions on
commercial speech concerned illegal or misleading speech because such
speech is lawfully regulated by the government.7 If this inquiry
revealed that the speech was lawful, the government's power to regulate
it was more circumscribed, and only a substantial government interest
would justify the imposition of restrictions on the speech.78 Finally, the
regulatory technique used by government to restrict the speech must be
carefully tailored to achieve the governmental interest. 79 Thus restated,
7 Id. at 563.
76 Id. at 563-66.
77 Id. at 563 (" [T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.").
78 Id. at 564. Noting that regulating commercial speech based on its content represented
an exception to the general rule that content-based regulations must meet strict scrutiny,
the Court offered its justifications for allowing such regulation:
Two features of commercial speech permit regulation of its content.
First, commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the
market and their products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the
accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying
activity .... In addition, commercial speech, the offspring of economic
self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not "particularly
susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation."
Id. at 564 n.6 (citations omitted). The Court has also suggested that commercial speech is
"less central to the interests of the First Amendment" than other types of speech and
acknowledged a fear that conferring equal status on commercial speech will, "simply by a
leveling process," erode the protections afforded noncommercial speech. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1985); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). But see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's
Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 634-37 (1990) (suggesting that there is no
rational basis for the commercial speech distinction and attacking the Court's proffered
justifications).
79 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. The Court explained that this last requirement has
two components. Id. First, the regulation is required to directly advance the state interest,
meaning that "the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote
support for the government's purpose." Id. Second, the restriction must be narrowly
tailored so that no less-restrictive alternative regulations would provide the same effect. Id.
Under the Central Hudson test, the government bears the burden of proof in justifying its
restrictions on commercial speech. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983).
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the four-part test of Central Hudson asks the following questions of
commercial speech restrictions:
1. Is the speech lawful, not misleading, and thus deserving of
protection? If so,
2. Is a substantial government interest asserted to justify speech
restrictions? If so,
3. Does the regulation directly advance the asserted governmental
interest? If so,
4. Is the restriction more extensive than is necessary to achieve the
government's objective (i.e., do less restrictive alternatives exist)? °
Applying the test to the facts in Central Hudson, the Court found the
speech to be truthful, concerning lawful matters, and no less-deserving
of protection because Central Hudson had monopolistic control over the
electricity needs of its consumers.8' Further, the Court found the
government's asserted interest in assuring fair rates to its consumers to
be substantial.8 2  The Court also found that the prohibitions on
advertising by the utility provider directly advanced the government's
interests.8 3 However, the regulations on advertising were invalidated
under the final step of the newly announced test because the government
failed to demonstrate that the same purpose could not be served by
means less restrictive of speech.s4
so Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Note that the test essentially resembles intermediate
scrutiny, which requires laws to be substantially related to an important government
interest. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976). In fact, the Court has since stated that intermediate scrutiny applies to
restrictions on commercial speech. See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995)
(stating that "we engage in 'intermediate' scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech,
analyzing them under the framework set forth in Central Hudson"). Additionally, the Court
has found the Central Hudson test to be "substantially similar" to its time, place, or manner
test used to evaluate restrictions on protected speech. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.16 (1987).
81 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566-67.
82 Id. at 569.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 570-71. Note that the last requirement of the Central Hudson test, the least-
restrictive means analysis, appears to at least be in doubt if not altogether abandoned by
the Court. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 1050-51. Emphasizing the broad authority of
government over commercial speech, the Court refused to apply a least-restrictive means
analysis in Board of Trustees v. Fox, stating that doing so would render illusive the "ample
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D. Recent Application of Central Hudson
Despite recurring questions by some Justices regarding its continued
viability, Central Hudson remains the test for commercial speech
regulations.85 However, in recent years the Court has interpreted Central
Hudson with increased vigor, especially with respect to its third and
fourth prongs, which require a "reasonable fit" between legislative
means and ends.86 In a series of cases, the Court has repeatedly struck
down legislation regulating commercial speech because the means used
by the legislature did not directly advance the asserted government
interest in regulating commercial speech.8 7 For instance, in 1993, in City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,88 the Court struck down a
Cincinnati ordinance that prohibited commercial newsracks from being
placed on public property while allowing noncommercial newsracks to
scope of [the state's] regulatory authority." 492 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1989). Instead, the Court
in Fox suggested that what was required by its precedents under the final prong of Central
Hudson was a reasonable fit between the legislature's ends and the means used to
accomplish those ends. Id. at 480; see infra note 152. However, despite Fox's rejection of the
least-restrictive means requirement, it was re-instituted six years later in Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). Without acknowledging that the requirement appeared to
have been abandoned, the Court, in striking down the governmental restrictions at issue in
Rubin, held that alternatives existed "that would prove less intrusive to the First
Amendment's protections for commercial speech." Rubin, 514 U.S. at 491. Adding to this
confusion was the Court's opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, which appeared to
recognize the validity of the least restrictive means analysis as well as the approach taken
in Fox. 517 U.S. 484, 507. Perhaps attempting to address this confusion, the Court, in a
recent case, affirmed the Central Hudson test for restrictions on commercial speech "as
applied in our more recent commercial speech cases." Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 554-55 (2001) (emphasis added). In Lorillard, the Court expressly stated that the least
restrictive means approach is not required but reaffirmed Fox's view that its precedents do
require "a reasonable 'fit between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to
accomplish those ends,... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective." Id.
at 556 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
85 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (positing that the Central Hudson test should not be applied in
instances where the government's interest is to keep consumers uninformed); 44
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 527 (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that Central Hudson is
difficult to apply with uniformity, thus leading to unprincipled results and calling for a
return to the reasoning and holding of Virginia State Board in certain types of cases). For
affirmation of Central Hudson as the test for commercial speech restrictions, see Lorillard,
533 U.S. at 554-55 (directly rejecting calls to apply a different standard by stating that
"Central Hudson, as applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an
adequate basis for decision").
86 See infra notes 87-115 and accompanying text.
87 See infra notes 88-115 and accompanying text.
8 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
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remain.89 The city's asserted interests in enforcing this ordinance were
aesthetic and safety concerns presented by the presence of the
newsracks.90 However, because the ordinance was applicable to only
sixty-two commercial newsracks, allowing approximately 2,000
noncommercial newsracks to remain, it did not directly advance the
city's interests and failed Central Hudson's "reasonable fit" requirement. 91
Similarly, in 1995, the Court, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,92
unanimously struck down a federal regulation that prohibited beer
labels from displaying alcohol content.93 Congress' asserted interest in
89 Id. at 430-31. Discovery Network provided adult educational and recreational
programs to Cincinnati-area residents. Id. at 412. It advertised the programs in a free
magazine it distributed nine times per year in thirty-eight newsracks the city had
authorized it to use in 1989. Id. Harmon Publishing Company, another plaintiff that
challenged the ordinance, distributed a free real estate magazine in twenty-four newsracks
on public property. Id. at 412-13. Using a pre-existing, unenforced ordinance that banned
distribution of "commercial handbills," the city revoked the permit of each plaintiff to
distribute its publication. Id. at 413. The plaintiffs were permitted to continue their use of
the newsracks while challenging the constitutionality of the city's order in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Id. at 414. Both the district court and the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the city's ordinance failed Central Hudson's
"reasonable fit" requirement. Id. at 414-15.
90 Id. at 412 ("Motivated by its interest in the safety and attractive appearance of its
streets and sidewalks, the city of Cincinnati has refused to allow respondents to distribute
their commercial publications through freestanding newsracks located on public
property.").
91 Id. at 417-18. The Court observed that the distinction made by the city's ordinance
between commercial and noncommercial newsracks "bears no relationship whatsoever to
the particular interests that the city has asserted." Id. at 424. The Court also held that the
ordinance was not a permissible time, place, or manner restriction of commercial speech
because the ban was not content-neutral. Id. at 429-30.
92 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
93 Id. at 491. The statute at issue in Rubin was part of the Federal Alcohol Administration
Act, 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2) (1994). Id. at 478. The Act was adopted by Congress shortly after
the Twenty-first Amendment ended the nation's experiment with Prohibition and was
designed to establish national rules concerning alcohol production, distribution, and
importation. Id. at 480. The relevant section of the Act prohibited advertising the alcoholic
strength of malt beverages unless state law required such disclosure. Id. at 480-81.
However, the regulations implementing the Act applied the provision only to states that
affirmatively prohibited advertising such information. Id. at 488. Because only eighteen
states prohibited these ads, brewers remained free in most of the country to advertise the
strength of their beer. Id. The Act was challenged by the Adolph Coors Brewing Company
after one of its proposed label designs was denied approval by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms pursuant to the regulation. Id. at 478-79. The United States District
Court for the District of Colorado entered a declaratory judgment for Coors, finding that
the statute violated the First Amendment. Id. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
following remand, finding that the government had failed to demonstrate in any way that
its prohibition directly advanced its interest. Id. at 479-80.
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that case was to prevent "strength wars" between brewers who might
seek to compete for customers on the basis of the alcoholic content of
their product.94 However, because the prohibition applied only to labels
on bottles of beer, and not to wine or liquor labels or to advertisements
for beer, the Court held that the regulation was irrational and did not
directly or materially advance the government's interest.95 Therefore, the
regulation was struck down under Central Hudson's third prong.96 This
reasoning was again applied by the Court in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode
Island97 in 1996 to strike down a statutory ban on liquor price
advertising.98 The government argued that it had a substantial interest
in reducing alcohol consumption in the state.99 However, the Court held
that any reduction in the rate of consumption would merely be
fortuitous because the State had presented no evidence that the speech
prohibition would actually serve its legislative purpose.10 0 Therefore, the
statute was invalidated under Central Hudson.10 1
94 Id. at 483. Alternatively, the government asserted an interest in facilitating state
efforts to regulate alcohol under the Twenty-first Amendment. Id. at 485. The Court
concluded that preventing strength wars among brewers constituted a substantial state
interest under Central Hudson but that assisting state efforts to regulate alcohol did not. Id.
at 485-86.
95 Id. at 488-89. The Court observed that the statute's
exemptions and inconsistencies bring into question the purpose of the
labeling ban. To be sure, the Government's interest in combating
strength wars remains a valid goal. But the irrationality of this unique
and puzzling regulatory framework ensures that the labeling ban will fail to
achieve that end. There is little chance that § 205(e)(2) can directly and
materially advance its aim, while other provisions of the same Act
directly undermine and counteract its effects.
Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
9 Id. at 491. The Court also observed, without analysis, that less restrictive alternatives
appeared to be available to Congress, thus invalidating the Act under Central Hudson's
fourth prong as well. Id.
97 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
98 Id. at 516. The challenged statutes were two separate 1956 enactments of the Rhode
Island Legislature. Id. at 489. The first prohibited in-state vendors and out-of-state
manufacturers, wholesalers, and shippers from advertising the price of any alcoholic
beverage in any manner. Id. The only exception to this statute was for price tags on liquor
inside a licensed vendor's premises so long as the price tags or signs were not visible from
outside the store. Id. The second statute categorically prohibited the publication or
broadcast of any advertisements referring to liquor prices including the prices of stores
located in states other than Rhode Island. Id. at 489-90.
99 Id. at 504.
100 Id. at 505-07 (observing that the state had presented no evidence to suggest that its
prohibition on commercial speech would significantly reduce marketwide consumption).
In making this finding, the Court emphasized that a party seeking to justify such a
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Continuing its intensive third-prong analysis, the Court, in 1999,
invalidated a federal statute restricting lawful gambling advertisements
on First Amendment grounds in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v.
United States.102 In that case, the plaintiff desired to broadcast radio and
television advertisements for lawful casino gambling in Louisiana and
Mississippi but was prevented from doing so by a federal regulation that
restricted such advertisements if they might also be received in nearby
states where gambling was unlawful.10 3 The statutory scheme enacted
by Congress to address gambling, however, included a number of
exemptions for certain types of gambling, such as Native American and
charitable gaming.1°4  These exemptions significantly curtailed the
coverage of the statute at issue.105 In defending a challenge brought
against its advertising ban by the plaintiff on First Amendment grounds,
the government asserted that it had substantial interests under Central
sweeping prohibition of lawful speech must make a significant factual showing "not
merely that its regulation will advance its interest, but also that it will do so to a material
degree." Id. at 505 (emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Court
further observed that "speculation or conjecture" is "an unacceptable means of
demonstrating that a restriction on commercial speech directly advances the State's
asserted interest." Id. at 507 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
101 Id. at 516. The Court also found that the statutes at issue failed to meet Central
Hudson's fourth prong, as less restrictive means such as a tax on liquor purchases or
educational programs were available. Id. at 507. Another significant concern of the Court
in 44 Liquormart was the attempt by the state to entirely prohibit the dissemination of
truthful, non-misleading commercial messages in order to protect its citizenry. Id. at 501-
03. The Court observed that such paternalistic statutes "usually rest on the offensive
assumption that the public will respond 'irrationally' to the truth." Id. at 503.
102 527 U.S. 173, 195-96 (1999).
103 Id. at 180-81. The statute at issue was 18 U.S.C § 1304, and its Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") implementing regulations was 47 CFR § 73.1211
(1998). Id. at 181. The statute provided that
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio or television station for
which a license is required by any law of the United States, or
whoever, operating any such station, knowingly permits the
broadcasting of, any advertisement of or information concerning any
lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in
whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or
awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme,
whether said list contains any part or all of such prizes, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994).
104 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, 527 U.S. at 178 (1999). The Court detailed at length
the exemptions which had affected the coverage of § 1304 since its enactment. Id. at 178-80.
Creating additional inconsistencies within the broadcasting ban were exemptions made for
state lotteries and exemptions contained within a related sports-gambling statute for
certain types of advertisements. Id. at 179.
105 ld. at 178.
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Hudson in reducing the social costs of gambling and in assisting states
that prohibited gambling in doing so.10 6 The government further
asserted that its prohibition, by limiting the advertisements, directly
advanced these interests.107 The Court, however, did not agree. Instead,
the Court found the statute fundamentally flawed because it was
"pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies." 108 Because the regulatory
scheme contained provisions that appeared to undermine the very goal
Congress sought to further through the ban on broadcast advertising, the
Court refused to believe that the ban directly advanced the government's
interest.109
As recently as 2001, the Court continued this line of reasoning under
Central Hudson and struck down portions of a Massachusetts statute
regulating tobacco advertisements in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly.110 The
regulation in question in Lorillard restricted point-of-sale advertising of
tobacco products and required ads in retail establishments to be placed
no lower than five feet from the floor."' The state's asserted goal in
106 Id. at 185. In describing the "social costs" of gambling, the government noted that
gambling "contributes to corruption and organized crime; underwrites bribery, narcotics
trafficking, and other illegal conduct; imposes a regressive tax on the poor; and offers a
false but sometimes irresistible hope of financial advancement." Id. (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
107 Id. at 189, 194. The government, in defending its first claimed interest, suggested that
by limiting the advertisement of casino gambling, demand would be decreased, thus
decreasing gambling's social costs. Id. at 189.
108 Id. at 190. The Court stated that
We need not resolve the question whether any lack of evidence in the
record fails to satisfy the standard of proof under Central Hudson,
however, because the flaw in the Government's case is more
fundamental: The operation of § 1304 and its attendant regulatory
regime is so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that the
Government cannot hope to exonerate it.
Id.
109 Id.; Arlen W. Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First Amendment Protection for
Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 587,
642 (2000). Langvardt suggests that, following Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, the Court
will now look beyond the statute being challenged when conducting a third-prong analysis
to the broader regulatory framework containing the speech prohibition. Id. Langvardt
observes that "[a] coherent regulatory policy-one that does not point simultaneously in
different directions-now seems a prerequisite to any realistic opportunity to clear part
three of the Central Hudson test." Id.
110 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
ill Id. at 565. The statute in question was part of a much larger statutory scheme
intended to combat perceived deceptive and unfair advertising practices and reduce
tobacco use in Massachusetts. Id. at 533-34. The Court also invalidated a separate section
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adopting this regulation was to curb the demand for tobacco products by
minors by limiting youth exposure to tobacco advertising.112 Once again,
the Court invalidated the regulation under the third prong of Central
Hudson, finding that the five-foot rule did not directly advance the state's
goal.11 3 The Court noted that not all children were under five feet in
height and those that were certainly had the ability to look up and take
in their surroundings.114 In striking down the regulation, the Court
observed that "[a] regulation cannot be sustained if it 'provides only
ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose' ... or if
there is 'little chance' that the restriction will advance the State's goal."" 5
Thus, in its adoption and application of Central Hudson, the Court
has expressed a willingness to extend First Amendment protection to
commercial speech and has provided standards for judging restrictions
on this type of speech. Accordingly, it is against these standards that any
legislative effort to restrict telemarketing must be judged.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PAST EFFORTS TO REGULATE
TELEMARKETING
Just as the citizens of Alexandria, Louisiana, in Breard, would likely
not have mourned the end of door-to-door sales calls, most people today
would probably applaud either the elimination of the telemarketing
industry or the placement of severe restrictions upon it.116 However,
proposed regulations of telemarketing must take into account the variety
of competing concerns reflected by Central Hudson. Legitimate privacy
expectations of consumers must be balanced not only against the First
Amendment rights of companies who would use telemarketing as a
means of advertising, but also against the First Amendment rights of
consumers who may be willing to receive that information from
of the Act that regulated outdoor tobacco advertising on First Amendment grounds. Id. at
555-65.
112 Id. at 566.
113 Id. Again, the Court additionally found a violation of Central Hudson's fourth prong.
Id. Without analyzing other less restrictive means available to the state to decrease youth
exposure to tobacco advertising, the Court merely observed that the means used by the
state did not constitute a "reasonable fit" within the meaning of Central Hudson. Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. (citations omitted).
116 See Hilary B. Miller & Robert R. Biggerstaff, Application of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act to Intrastate Telemarketing Calls and Faxes, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 686 (2000)
(noting studies indicating that approximately 75% of those surveyed were in favor of
restrictions on telemarketing).
2002] 367
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telemarketers. 117 As an asserted government interest under Central
Hudson, privacy rights may be particularly important should a challenge
to telemarketing regulation ever find its way to the Supreme Court.
While the Court would likely not tolerate extensive bans placed on
unsolicited telemarketing calls due to free speech concerns, the Court's
recognition of the constitutional right to privacy would support
significant restrictions on such calls.11 8
With or without these concerns in mind, Congress and most state
legislatures have undertaken regulation of the telemarketing industry in
one form or another. 1 9 The bulk of this legislation is directed at the use
of automatic dialing and announcing devices ("ADADs").120 Because
117 Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Lisa Boardman Burnette, Telemarketing Tug-of-War: Balancing
Telephone Information Technology and the First Amendment with Consumer Protection and
Privacy, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029, 1030 (1992).
118 Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone Calls and the Right of Privacy, 4
YALE J. ON REG. 99, 104-05 (1986). The Court's precedents have consistently upheld the
privacy right of individuals within their homes. Justice Brandeis once referred to "the right
to be let alone" as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). This
notion was invoked by the Court to uphold a statute authorizing addressees to refuse
delivery of unsolicited advertisements through the mail. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) ("That we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home
and subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must be captives
everywhere[,] . .. [t]he asserted right of a mailer, we repeat, stops at the outer boundary of
every person's domain."). Likewise the Court upheld prohibitions on the use of a sound
truck to broadcast speech due to its intrusion into the home. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
87 (1949). The Court recently reiterated these sentiments by explaining that "the right to
avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of the home." Hill v. Colorado,
530 U.S. 703, 717 (2000). In fact, the Court has explicitly stated that "in the privacy of the
home . . . the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment
rights of an intruder." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
119 Joseph R. Cox, Note, Telemarketing, the First Amendment, and Privacy: Expanding
Telemarketing Regulations Without Violating the Constitution, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y
403, 403 (1996) (citing a Ninth Circuit decision that reported that forty-one states and the
District of Columbia had enacted telemarketing legislation directed at automatic dialing
and announcing devices).
120 See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statute or
Law Pertaining to Telephone Solicitation, 44 A.L.R. 5th 619, 619 (1996) (discussing the
problems posed by ADADs, computerized dialing devices that automatically dial phone
numbers to play pre-recorded messages and "which can and will literally call every
number that exists"); see also Cox, supra note 119, at 404. Cox states that
ADADs were singled out for regulation because people found the
absence of a live operator particularly frustrating. Additionally, when
the technology was in its early stages, the computers sometimes tied
up all the lines of a single business, in some cases hospitals, or failed to
disconnect after the recipient hung up, thus creating safety concerns.
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these regulations, and the subsequent challenges to them, provide
background for analyzing the constitutionality of telemarketing
legislation, a review is essential to understand how future challenges
will be viewed. Therefore, this Note will briefly consider both federal
and representative state efforts to regulate telemarketing and the most
significant challenges to the regulation.121
A. Federal Efforts: The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
By enacting the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
("TCPA"), "Congress took the first significant step in curbing what many
perceived as an onslaught of telemarketing that had invaded American
homes." 122 Responding to significant expansion of the telemarketing
industry and consumer complaints, particularly involving the use of
ADADs, Congress enacted the TCPA in order to "protect the privacy
interests of residential telephone subscribers."123 Federal legislation was
viewed as being necessary due to the inadequacy of state efforts to reach
interstate calls and the failure of the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") to take affirmative action toward regulation of the
problem. 124
But perhaps the most compelling reason for regulating ADADs was
their potential proliferation and dogged efficiency: a single person
operating 193 ADADs could call every U.S. residence once a week.
Cox, supra note 119, at 404. Illustrative of the problems posed by ADADs is the example of
a New York mother who was unable to summon an ambulance to attend her collapsed
child. James Barron, 'Junk' Phone Calls: Danger on the Line?, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1988, § 1,
at 36, available at LEXIS, News & Business, News, Major Newspapers File. This situation
was caused by an ADAD that refused to disconnect from the woman's telephone line
despite her having hung up the phone. Id. Other examples include the use of ADADs to
sell a subscription to Playboy magazine to a three-year-old and a new roof to another child
in Dallas, Texas. Id.
121 See infra Part IIL.A-D.
122 Miller & Biggerstaff, supra note 116, at 668; The Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000).
123 S. REP. No. 102-178, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968. Among its
findings, the Senate noted that the FCC received over 2,300 consumer complaints in 1990.
Id. It was further noted that the telemarketing industry had revenues of approximately
$435 billion in 1990, an increase of over 400% from 1984. Id. at 1970. Part of the success of
the telemarketing industry was attributed to the use of ADADs, which dramatically
reduced the costs of telemarketing. Id. Data relied on by the Senate indicated that
telemarketers used ADADs to call over seven million numbers in the United States daily.
Id.
124 Id. The Senate noted that, although over forty states had enacted legislation directed
at the use of ADADs, such measures were of limited effectiveness because the states, unlike
Congress, did not have jurisdiction over interstate calls. Id. The FCC had previously
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The TCPA takes several steps to limit the types of telemarketing calls
that can be made.125 First, it prohibits any calls made by ADADs to
emergency telephone numbers, to the telephone lines of patients in
health care facilities, or to pagers, cellular telephones, or any service
where the party called is responsible for the costs of the call.126 Second, it
bans all ADAD calls to residential telephone numbers, except for calls
previously consented to or those made for emergency purposes. 127
Third, ADAD calls to fax machines or computers are prohibited. 128
Finally, the use of ADADs to occupy more than two telephone lines of a
business at any one time is unlawful. 129 However, Congress specifically
authorized the FCC, in implementing the TCPA, to exempt calls made
for reasons other than commercial purposes.130
The TCPA provides for both private and government enforcement.131
Individuals who have received two or more telephone calls prohibited
by the act in any twelve-month period are entitled to injunctive relief
plus actual damages or the sum of five hundred dollars, whichever is
determined that it should refrain from regulating unsolicited telemarketing calls and
ADADs, viewing an outright ban on the latter as unconstitutional. In re Unsolicited
Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1024 (1980).
125 See Cox, supra note 119, at 405.
126 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) (exempting calls either consented to or made for
emergency purposes); Cox, supra note 119, at 405.
127 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B); Cox, supra note 119, at 405. Congress provided that calls
made under this provision could later be exempted by the FCC. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B).
128 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C); Cox, supra note 119, at 405.
129 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(D); Cox, supra note 119, at 405.
130 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(B)(i) ("The Commission shall prescribe regulations to implement
the requirements of this subsection. In [doing so], the Commission... may... exempt...
calls that are not made for a commercial purpose."). The FCC did in fact exempt, among
other types of calls, calls made for noncommercial purposes and those made by nonprofit
organizations from the provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
("TCPA"). See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) (2000). This different treatment of nonprofit
organizations by Congress and the subsequent FCC regulations implementing the TCPA
has been criticized as being an unconstitutional, content-based distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech. See Deborah L. Hamilton, Note, The First
Amendment Status of Commercial Speech: Why the FCC Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 Are Unconstitutional, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2352, 2355 (1996).
Hamilton suggests that this distinction fails the Central Hudson test because the means used
by Congress in banning calls with recorded commercial, but not noncommercial, purposes
does not fit the end of protecting the privacy of telephone consumers. Id. at 2376.
Hamilton further argues, in looking at the TCPA's legislative history, that Congress failed
to adequately demonstrate that recorded commercial advertisements cause harms that
recorded messages serving other ends do not. Id. at 2377-80. But see infra text
accompanying note 155 for the Ninth Circuit's decision on the TCPA's content neutrality.
131 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), (c)(5), (0(1); Cox, supra note 119, at 405-06.
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greater.132 Should citizens fail to assert their own claims, states are
authorized to bring civil actions on behalf of their residents providing
similar relief.133 Further, the TCPA explicitly provides that it does not
preempt state laws imposing more restrictive regulations on intrastate
telemarketing calls.134
Interestingly, Congress chose not to impose similar restrictions on
live telemarketing calls even though many people likely find such calls
as annoying as those made by ADADs.135 Instead, the FCC was
authorized to initiate rulemaking proceedings to implement the TCPA.136
The FCC was given discretion to evaluate a number of alternative
methods and procedures to regulate telemarketing calls. 37  These
methods included the use of electronic databases, emerging telephone
technologies, specially-marked telephone directories, and even "do-not-
call" systems, presumably national in scope, which would likely have
prohibited live telemarketing calls. 138 However, the FCC failed to adopt
any of these alternative measures, opting instead to require individual
telemarketing companies to maintain their own lists of consumers who
express a desire not to be solicited by their company by telephone. 39
132 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5); Cox, supra note 119, at 405-06.
133 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(0(1); Cox, supra note 119, at 406. Both the individual and
government remedies provide for treble damages in the case of willful or knowing
violations of the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), (0(1).
134 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1); Cox, supra note 119, at 406. This "savings clause" preserves
intact state laws that are more restrictive than the TCPA, preempting less-restrictive
regulations by establishing broad, minimum standards for the states to follow or enhance.
Miller & Biggerstaff, supra note 116, at 675.
135 Michael E. Shannon, Note, Combating Unsolicited Sales Calls: The "Do-Not-Call"
Approach to Solving the Telemarketing Problem, 27 J. LEGIS. 381, 389-90 (2001).
136 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1).
137 Id. § 227(c)(1)(A).
138 Id. President H.W. Bush, apparently reluctant to sign the TCPA into law because of its
potential negative impact on businesses, did so with an express statement that the FCC was
to interpret the TCPA in a manner which "preserve[s] legitimate business practices." 27
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1877 (Dec. 23, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1979.
This perhaps explains the FCC's reluctance to broaden the scope of the TCPA.
139 Shannon, supra note 135, at 390 n.74 (citing the statement of Andrew Barrett,
Commissioner of the FCC at the time the regulations went into effect, who felt that
"company-specific do-not[-Icall lists" were "the most effective, easily implemented and the
least costly of the methods proposed to curb unwanted telephone solicitations"). Under
the FCC's regulations implementing the TCPA, each person or entity making telephone
solicitations must establish a written policy for maintaining a do-not-call list of consumers
who request to receive no further telephone sales calls and must maintain a record of the
party's request for a ten-year period. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(2)(i), (iii), (vi) (2000). The FCC,
however, is presently considering changes to these regulations. See infra note 246.
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The steps taken by the TCPA, at the time it was enacted, were an
unprecedented attempt to reduce the intrusive effect of telemarketing on
the privacy of residential telephone consumers.140 Perhaps due to this
fact, concerns were expressed from the TCPA's very inception as to its
constitutionality, particularly with respect to its intrusion on the First
Amendment's protection of speech.'41 However, despite the TCPA's
apparent abridgment of commercial speech rights, courts have rejected
several challenges to its constitutionality.142
B. Challenges to the TCPA
1. Moser v. FCC
In 1992, the first significant challenge to the TCPA's constitutionality
was brought in Moser v. FCC.143 Kathryn Moser and her husband,
operators of a small chimney-sweep business in Keizer, Oregon, relied
on the use of ADADs to generate interest in their services.1 The Mosers
initially sought and obtained preliminary injunctive relief from the
140 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
141 See S. REP. No. 102-178, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968.
Some people have raised questions about whether S. 1462 [the TCPA]
is consistent with the First Amendment protections of freedom of
speech. The [Commerce, Science and Transportation] Committee
believes that S. 1462 is an example of a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction on speech, which is constitutional. The reported
bill, does not discriminate based on the content of the message. It
applies equally whether the automated message is made for
commercial, political, charitable, or other purposes. The reported bill
regulates the manner (that is, the use of an artificial or prerecorded
voice) of speech and the place (the home) where the speech is received.
Id. The Senate report went on to cite decisions of the Supreme Court that emphasized the
legitimacy of such restrictions on speech when privacy was sought to be protected
including Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726
(1978). Id.
142 See William G. Phelps, Annotation, Validity, Construction and Application of Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C.A. § 227), 132 A.L.R. FED. 625, 630 (1996).
143 811 F. Supp. 541 (D. Or. 1992).
144 Id. at 542. Kathryn Moser was also the president of the National Association of
Telephone Operators, a named plaintiff in this matter, which represented small businesses
employing telemarketing sales techniques. Id. The Mosers also successfully challenged an
Oregon telemarketing statute regulating the use of ADADs. See Moser v. Frohnmayer, 845
P.2d 1284 (Or. 1993). The Oregon Supreme Court, applying the Oregon Constitution, held
that the statute at issue drew unconstitutional distinctions between calls made for
commercial versus noncommercial purposes. Id. at 1288. For discussion and criticism of
this decision, see George Pitcher, Note, Moser v. Frohnmayer: Oregon's Dangerous Approach
to Protecting Commercial Speech, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 685 (1995).
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TCPA's provisions while the Oregon District Court considered the First
Amendment implications of the congressional scheme. 45 Thereafter, the
court held that the TCPA's prohibition against the use of ADADs to send
recorded messages was an unconstitutional burden on the Mosers'
commercial speech. 46 The court reasoned that, because the TCPA, as
implemented by the FCC, prohibited ADAD calls for commercial
purposes while permitting the same calls for noncommercial uses, it
impermissibly drew content-based distinctions between telemarketers.' 47
The court, therefore, rejected a content-neutral time, place, or manner
analysis and, instead, applied the Central Hudson test for restrictions on
commercial speech. 48
Although acknowledging the substantial government interest in
protecting privacy, the court found that the TCPA failed the third and
fourth prongs of Central Hudson. 49 The court reasoned that, because
privacy was equally invaded by both commercial and noncommercial
calls, the TCPA did not directly advance Congress' interest in protecting
privacy.150 The court also found the TCPA's ban on ADAD calls, while
permitting telemarketing calls made by a human telemarketer,
inconsistent with its stated interest in protecting privacy. 15' For these
reasons, and because of concerns regarding the effectiveness of the
statute, the court found that the TCPA did not possess the "reasonable
145 Moser, 811 F. Supp. at 546.
146 Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360, 367 (D. Or. 1993).
147 Id. at 363. The court rejected the government's claim that the TCPA was, on its face,
not content-based and that it was the FCC regulations that instead drew distinctions
between the two types of speech, finding rather that the statute itself sufficiently
distinguished among forms of speech. Id.
148 Id. at 363-64.
149 Id. at 365. The court relied heavily on City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410 (1993), in its opinion as that case had been decided only two months earlier. See
generally id. The Court in Discovery Network invalidated a Cincinnati regulatory scheme for
lack of a "reasonable fit" between the city's interest in aesthetics and safety and its partial
ban of newsracks on public property. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 417. For a statement of
the Discovery Network decision, see supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
150 Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 365-66 (the third prong). The court stated,
There is no . . . justification presented . . . in the bald assertion that
banning commercial solicitations but not nonprofit solicitations
furthers the protection of residential tranquility. Both kinds of
telemarketing calls trigger the same ring of the telephone; both kinds
of calls invade the home equally, and both risk interrupting the
recipient's privacy equally ....
Id. at 366.
151 Id.
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fit" between legislative means and ends that Central Hudson and its
progeny required. 15 2
Two years later, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court.153 Finding that nothing in the TCPA itself requires the FCC
to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the district court had erred in applying
Central Hudson.l s4 The court found instead that the TCPA should be
152 Id. at 366-67 (utilizing the fourth prong). The court's concern for the effectiveness of
the TCPA was based on evidence presented that indicated that calls banned by the statute
represented less than three percent of all telemarketing calls received by Americans. Id. at
366. For a discussion of the "reasonable fit" requirement under Central Hudson's fourth
prong, see supra note 84. This requirement was discussed at length by the Supreme Court
in Fox:
What our decisions require is a "'fit' between the legislature's ends and
the means chosen to accomplish those ends,"-a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope is "in proportion to the
interest served[;]" that employs not necessarily the least restrictive
means but, as we have put it in other contexts discussed above, a
means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. Within those
bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers to judge what
manner of regulation may best be employed.
Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (citations omitted). It should be noted that some
courts view the "reasonable fit" requirement as part of Central Hudson's fourth prong. See,
e.g., Minnesota v. Casino Mktg. Group Inc., 491 N.W.2d 882, 891 (Minn. 1992). However,
since the Court referred to both governmental means and ends in Fox, other courts have
viewed the "reasonable fit" requirement as collapsing the third and fourth prongs of
Central Hudson into a single inquiry. See Lysaght v. New Jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646, 650 n.5
(D.N.J. 1993). The district court's opinion in Moser triggered criticism of the TCPA's
approach to the telemarketing problem. One writer suggests that the two primary
distinctions made by the TCPA-the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
calls and that between live and recorded solicitations-"bear[s] little relation" to the
legitimate interest of protecting privacy." Howard E. Berkenblit, Note, Can Those
Telemarketing Machines Keep Calling Me?-The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 After
Moser v. FCC, 36 B.C. L. REV. 85, 109 (1994). Berkenblit goes on to suggest that all of the
concerns of Congress in enacting the TCPA remain after its passage due to its failure to
eliminate noncommercial and live telemarketing calls and that, in the end, "[bly only
banning ADADs used in commercial speech, Congress made a judgment about the content
of the message, rather than the use of ADADs." Id. at 111-12.
153 Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1161 (1995).
154 Id. at 973 (finding the language directing the FCC to establish regulations and consider
the exemption of noncommercial calls "permissive ... not mandatory"). This finding,
which is critical to determining which test to apply, seems a bit disingenuous given the
wording of the TCPA. See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also Paul S.
Zimmerman, Note & Comment, Hanging up on Commercial Speech: Moser v. FCC, 71 WASH.
L. REV. 571, 586-87 (1996) (asserting that the TCPA "on its face" distinguishes between
commercial and noncommercial speech and that the Ninth Circuit "ignored both the plain
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analyzed as a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction on
speech. 55 Applying this test, the court acknowledged the government's
substantial interest in protecting residential privacy. 5 6 The court further
reasoned, in light of the findings of Congress, that the TCPA was
sufficiently narrowly tailored.15 7 Finally, the court found that the TCPA
left open ample alternative channels for communication of the
telemarketer's message.158 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found the TCPA
constitutional.15 9
2. Other Challenges
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, heard another
early challenge to the TCPA's constitutionality in Szefczek v. Hillsborough
Beacon.160 In Szefczek, a pro se telephone consumer brought an action
under the FCC regulations implementing the TCPA, which required
telemarketing businesses to maintain company-specific "do-not-call"
lists.161 Since the defendant in this matter contended that the TCPA was
unconstitutional, the United States intervened to defend the TCPA's
constitutionality. 162 The court first found the relevant sections of the
TCPA to be content neutral, as all telemarketers were subject to the "do-
meaning of the statute and the evidence of legislative intent" to rule that the statute was
not content based). But see Rita Marie Cain, Call up Someone and Just Say 'Buy'-Telemarketing
and the Regulatory Environment, 31 AM. Bus. L. J. 641, 651 (1994) (suggesting that it was the
district court's analysis in Moser that was flawed). For a statement of the time, place, or
manner test, see supra note 70.
155 Moser, 46 F.3d at 973.
156 Id. at 974.
'57 Id. at 974-75 (citing the extensive evidence before Congress of the particular problem
posed by ADADs and Congress' consideration of less-restrictive alternatives). The court,
citing the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418,
434 (1993), also noted that Congress was entitled to regulate some telemarketing calls
without prohibiting them all. Id. at 974 ("Nor do we require that the Government make
progress on every front before it can make progress on any front.").
158 Id. at 975 (suggesting the possibility of using live solicitation or taped messages
introduced by live speakers, practices not proscribed by the TCPA).
159 Id.
160 668 A.2d 1099 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995). Although a federal statute, the TCPA
specifically authorizes a private right of action in state courts if such an action is permitted
by state law. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2000).
161 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. The plaintiff received several telephone
calls from the same solicitor despite repeated requests to be removed from the
telemarketer's list. Szefczek, 668 A.2d at 1101-02.
162 Id. at 1102. As the court in Szefczek was deciding that case only days after the Ninth
Circuit had issued its opinion in Moser, the court was forced to consider Moser's
implications. Id. at 1103. The court, as a preliminary matter, found Moser inapposite as it
arose under a different section of the TCPA. Id.
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not-call" list requirements. 163  Thereafter, the court applied Central
Hudson to the challenged portion of the TCPA.'6 The court found that
Congress had a substantial governmental interest in enacting the TCPA
and its subsequent regulations.165 The court further found that the TCPA
directly advanced the governmental interest in protecting privacy. 166
Finally, the court held that the TCPA and its regulations were narrowly
tailored in that they did not restrict speech that was not intended to be
restricted. 167
Another section of the TCPA was tested in Destination Ventures, Ltd.
v. FCC.168 The plaintiff in Destination Ventures, a business that advertised
seminars for travel agents by sending unsolicited faxed advertisements
to travel agencies, brought First and Fifth Amendment challenges to the
section of the TCPA banning such advertisements. 169 Applying Central
Hudson, the district court found, despite somewhat less congressional
concern for fax advertisements in the TCPA's legislative history, that
Congress had a substantial governmental interest in regulating this type
of communication. 170 Further, the court found that the banning of
unsolicited fax advertisements directly advanced the government's
interest.' 71 The court further found the challenged portions of the TCPA
to be sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the "reasonable fit"
required for restrictions on commercial speech despite less restrictive
163 Id. at 1105-06. Interestingly, the court appeared to disagree with the Ninth Circuit in
Moser by suggesting that the sections of the TCPA considered by the Moser court did
distinguish between the messages being delivered on the basis of content. Id.
164 Id. at 1106.
165 Id. at 1108.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1109 (finding that the relevant FCC regulations only restricted telephone
solicitations during certain hours and then only when consumers requested to be placed on
"do-not-call" lists). The court, after upholding the TCPA's constitutionality, awarded
injunctive relief and damages of $500 per call received by the plaintiff in violation of the
TCPA and denied treble damages. Id. at 1110-11.
168 844 F. Supp. 632 (D. Or. 1994).
169 Id. at 634. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2000) provides that "[iut shall be unlawful for any
person... to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an
unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine." For a discussion of the "junk
fax" problem addressed by this section of the TCPA and the cost-shifting associated with
advertisers forcing fax recipients to pay for unsolicited ads, see Michael M. Parker, Note,
Fax Pas: Stopping the Junk Fax Mail Bandwagon, 71 OR. L. REV. 457 (1992).
170 Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 637.
171 Id.
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means being available to Congress. 172 Finally, the court upheld the
TCPA against a Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge finding
that, in the absence of any suspect class targeted by the statute, the
provision clearly had a rational basis in protecting consumers from the
burdens imposed by the receipt of unsolicited faxes. 173 This reasoning
was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on appeal, which underscored that
Congress had achieved a reasonable fit between the TCPA's means and
end.174
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana upheld the same portions of the TCPA against a commercial
speech challenge in Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc.175 The court in Kenro also
found that the damage provisions of the TCPA did not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment despite the fact that no judicial
review of damages was permitted by the statutorily-prescribed
remedy.1 76 In fact, with the exception of the district court opinion in
Moser that was later reversed, the TCPA has been looked on with favor
by each court to hear a challenge to it.17 7 Given this acceptance of
telemarketing regulation by the federal government, it is perhaps natural
172 Id. at 637-39. The court found Discovery Network inapposite because, unlike the
ordinance at issue in that case, the TCPA served the specific purpose Congress meant for it
to serve. Id. at 639.
173 Id. at 639-40.
174 Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56-57 (9th Cir. 1995) (refuting
appellant's claim that there was no reasonable fit since other "noncommercial" unsolicited
faxes were not banned and finding the TCPA's prohibition of unsolicited faxes "even-
handed" because "it applies to commercial solicitation by any organization, be it a
multinational corporation or the Girl Scouts").
175 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1167-69 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (applying Central Hudson and following the
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Destination Ventures).
176 Id. at 1167.
17 See, e.g., Murphey v. Lanier, 204 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2000) (joining five other circuits in
concluding that the TCPA's grant of jurisdiction to state courts is not unconstitutional); Int'l
Sci. & Tech. Inst. v. Inacom Communications Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1157 (4th Cir. 1997)
(finding no violation of equal protection under the TCPA despite the fact that private
actions for violations of its provisions were permitted in the courts of some states and
prohibited in others and that the TCPA did not impermissibly commandeer state courts in
violation of the Tenth Amendment); Hooters Inc. v. Nicholson, 537 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. Ct. App.
2000) (interpreting the TCPA as permitting private state court actions). But see Missouri v.
Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 920, 927-34 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (declaring portions of TCPA
governing unsolicited fax advertisements unconstitutional under a Central Hudson third-
prong analysis); see also infra Part IV.D.1.
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that the majority of states would also attempt to protect the privacy of
their citizens from the effects of telemarketing. 178
C. State Efforts to Regulate Telemarketing
By large measure, state legislation aimed at the problems caused by
telemarketing has enjoyed approval in the courts similar to that of the
TCPA.179 Although much of the state legislation presently codified is
directed at the problems caused by ADADs, new legislation is routinely
being enacted around the nation.180 Indeed, during the first half of 1999
alone, various state legislatures introduced more than 150 bills designed
to regulate the telemarketing industry.181
The states vary in their approaches to telemarketing regulation.
Many state statutes follow the example of the federal government and
contain provisions similar to those of the TCPA.182 For example, some
states require telemarketing companies to establish and maintain their
own "do-not-call" lists of consumers who request telemarketing
companies not to contact them a second time.183 Other states regulate the
manner in which telemarketing can take place, restricting such things as
the hours that telephone solicitation can be conducted or requiring live
operators to first introduce themselves and ask the telephone consumer's
consent to continue184 Other statutes deal more closely with the use of
ADADs, either prohibiting their employment by telemarketers, or
178 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. The TCPA is not the federal government's
only response to the telemarketing industry. In 1994, in an attempt to address the
emerging problem of interstate telemarketing fraud, Congress enacted the Telemarketing
and Consumer Fraud Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108 (2000). This Act
empowered the Federal Trade Commission to prescribe rules prohibiting deceptive or
abusive telemarketing acts or practices. 15 U.S.C. § 6102. These regulations, known as the
Telemarketing Sales Rule, are set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations. 16 C.F.R. § 310
(2001).
179 See generally Zitter, supra note 120. State telemarketing regulation is not preempted by
the TCPA due to the Act's "savings clause," which allows states to adopt regulations that
are more restrictive than the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1) (2000); see supra note 134 and
accompanying text.
180 See Cox, supra note 119 (stating that, as of 1995 when Moser was decided by the Ninth
Circuit, forty-one states and the District of Columbia had enacted statutes addressing the
use of ADADs).
181 Shannon, supra note 135, at 393.
182 Id.
183 Id. (citing laws in the states of Nebraska, Maine, and Rhode Island that require such
lists).
184 See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 413/15 (West 1999).
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allowing them to be utilized subject to certain requirements. 185 Although
surprisingly few constitutional challenges have been brought against
state telemarketing regulations, a few of the cases that have been
decided, like the cases interpreting the TCPA, provide insight into how
future challenges may be viewed.
1. Lysaght v. New Jersey
One of the earliest challenges to a state telemarketing statute, and the
only currently valid precedent striking down telemarketing regulations
on constitutional grounds, is Lysaght v. New Jersey.186 In Lysaght, both
individual telemarketers and the National Association of Telecomputer
Operators brought suit to enjoin the State of New Jersey and its Attorney
General from enforcing its new law restricting the use of ADADs for
commercial purposes1 87 In considering the burden placed on the
commercial free speech rights of the plaintiffs, the court rejected the
State's invitation to analyze the statute as content neutral under the time,
place, or manner test.1 88 Instead, because the content of the message was
185 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2919 (West 2001) (criminalizing the use of ADADs
if used "for the purpose of soliciting persons to purchase goods or services"); CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODE § 2874(a) (West 1994) (prohibiting the use of ADADs unless first introduced by
a live operator who obtains consent to play any recorded message). Indiana adopted a law
regulating the use of ADADs in 1988. See IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-14-1 (West 1995). This
statute prohibits the use of ADADs for "commercial telephone solicitation" unless the
device is designed and operated so that it will disconnect within ten seconds after the
telephone consumer hangs up. Id. §§ 24-5-14-3, 24-5-14-6. The statute exempts the use of
ADADs when used for public purposes, when used to inform employees of work
schedules, and in cases where the telephone consumer has a pre-existing business
relationship or has consented to receive such calls. Id. §§ 24-5-14-3, 24-5-14-5. The statute
specifically forbids the use of ADADs to call health care providers, law enforcement
agencies, or fire departments. Id. § 24-5-14-12.
18 837 F. Supp. 646 (D.N.J. 1993). For Lysaght's precedential value, see Cox, supra note
119, at 418-19; see generally Zitter, supra note 120.
187 Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 646-47. Plaintiffs alleged both that the New Jersey statute
violated their First Amendment rights and that the statute was preempted by the TCPA.
Id. at 648. The challenged statute provided that "[a] caller shall not use a telephone or
telephone line to contact a subscriber to deliver a recorded message for the purpose of
delivering commercial advertisement to the subscriber, unless the recorded message is
introduced by an operator who shall obtain the subscriber's consent before playing the
recorded message .. " N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:17-28 (West 1998). In 1997, the statute was
amended to apply only to intrastate calls and all calls made by ADADs, for all purposes
except emergencies. Id.
198 Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 649.
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determinative of whether a particular message was prohibited by the
statute, the court applied Central Hudson.189
As neither the first nor second prongs of Central Hudson were
disputed by the parties, the court turned immediately to whether the
New Jersey statute possessed the reasonable fit required between the
legislature's ends and the means used to achieve them.190 In answering
this question, the court considered whether the distinctions drawn by the
statute, those between recorded and live calls, and those between
commercial and noncommercial messages, were reasonably related to
New Jersey's interest in protecting privacy.'9' Drawing support from the
district court's opinion in Moser, the court held that the distinctions
drawn by the statute could not be reconciled with its purpose and,
therefore, found that the statute failed the reasonable fit requirement.192
Put simply, the court stated, "[Bloth commercial and noncommercial
prerecorded messages equally disrupt residential privacy ... [and] all
telemarketing calls, whether non-recorded, introduced by a live
operator, or prerecorded, threaten the privacy of the home."' 93
Because the Lysaght Court imported reasoning from the district
court's opinion in Moser that was later reversed, the precedential value of
Lysaght has been questioned. 94 However, as different statutes and
circuits were involved in each case, the Lysaght decision has not been
overturned and may well appear attractive to courts in the future when
considering similar statutes due to the confused reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit's Moser opinion. 95 If for no other reason, Lysaght remains
relevant for its singular willingness to strike down telemarketing
regulations as unconstitutional.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 650. In discussing the strength of the state interest, the court, considering U.S.
Supreme Court precedents on privacy, found the state interest to be particularly strong due
to the ability of telemarketing calls to hold the called party captive in his own home. Id.
For a discussion of the Court's recognition of the privacy right, see supra note 118 and
accompanying text.
191 Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 650.
192 Id. at 651-52. The court also relied extensively on the Supreme Court's opinion in
Discovery Network. Id. at 650-52; see also supra notes 88-91.
193 Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 651, 653.
194 See Cox, supra note 119, at 418.
195 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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Two challenges were brought against a Minnesota statute governing
the use of ADADs, which, unlike the New Jersey law, makes only limited
distinctions between commercial and noncommercial speech.196 The
primary purpose of the statute is instead to prohibit the use of ADADs,
unless any message is first preceded by a live operator who obtains the
called party's consent to play the message.1 97
The first challenge brought against this statute, Minnesota v. Casino
Marketing Group, Inc.,198 was initiated before the TCPA was enacted. Like
Lysaght, the challenge was brought by telemarketers on First
Amendment grounds to enjoin the enforcement of Minnesota's statute.199
Despite the careful wording of the statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court
found it to be clearly directed at commercial speech and applied Central
Hudson.200 Although the court downplayed the state's asserted interest
of preventing fraud by enacting the statute, it did find the State's interest
in protecting privacy to be overwhelming due to the "startling"
efficiency of ADADs and the intrusion they represented on citizens'
privacy. 201
196 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325E.26-325E.31 (West 1995). The statute does define
"commercial telephone solicitation;" however, only the time of day restrictions in the
statute apply to that term. Id. § 325E.30. Despite its content neutrality, Minnesota
amended the statute in 1994, apparently in an effort to make the statute more content
neutral in the wake of Moser, Lysaght, and Discovery Network. Cox, supra note 119, at 414.
197 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.27. This section and the time of day restrictions do not
apply to messages from school districts to parents, messages advising employees of their
work schedules, or messages between parties with business or personal relationships. Id.
The statute also exempts calls by ADADs that have been knowingly requested or consented
to. Id.
198 491 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1992).
199 Id. at 884-85. The telemarketers' claim was actually a counterclaim to suits filed
against them under the statute and a subsequent motion by the State for an order enjoining
their use of ADADs. Id. A state constitutional claim was also made under a provision
similar to the First Amendment. Id. However, since Minnesota interpreted its own
provision in accordance with the First Amendment, the First Amendment analysis was
dispositive of the state issue. Id. at 885 n.2.
200 Id. at 886-87.
201 Id. at 888. Justice Coyne's description of the telephone's capacity to intrude on
privacy has been widely quoted:
The telephone ... is uniquely intrusive. The caller, who can convey
messages which very young children can understand, is able to enter
the home for expressive purposes without contending with such
barriers as time or distance, doors or fences .... Moreover, the shrill
and imperious ring of the telephone demands immediate attention.
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The court's analysis of the statute in light of Central Hudson's third
prong stands in rather stark contrast to the Lysaght court's reasoning.
The Casino Marketing court held that the statute did directly advance the
state's interest even though ADADs could still be used if first introduced
by a live operator.202 The court held that this requirement was met
because the statute both reduced the efficiency with which such calls
could be made and because live operators, as opposed to ADADs, could
ascertain the propriety of proceeding to play a recorded message.2 3 The
court specifically rejected the contention that the statute failed to directly
advance the state interest because charitable organizations were
exempted from the statute's definition of commercial telephone
solicitation, stating that
[The statute] directly advances the state's objective of
protecting residential privacy by reducing the number of
unsolicited commercial telephone calls. The state is free
to believe that commercial telephone solicitation is a
more acute problem than charitable solicitation; and the
legislature is free to determine that in the light of
Minnesotans' recognized sense of community, the
enhancement of the quality of life in this state by
charitable contributions is of greater value than
Unlike the unsolicited bulk mail advertisement found in the mail
collected at the resident's leisure, the ring of the telephone mandates
prompt response, interrupting a meal, a restful soak in the bathtub,
even intruding on the intimacy of the bedroom. Indeed for the elderly
or disabled, the note of urgency sounded by the ring of the telephone
signals a journey which may subject the subscriber to the risk of injury.
Unlike the radio or television ... the telephone [deprives the
subscriber] of the ability to select the expression to which he or she will
expose herself or himself.
Id. at 888-89.
202 Id. at 890. The court felt that requiring live operators to introduce ADAD calls was a
reasonable response to the problem posed by the machines because that requirement
balanced the speech and privacy interests at stake. Id.
203 Id. The court rejected the argument that the statute failed to directly advance the
state's interest because live operators intrude similarly on privacy. Id. The court held that
"[a] regulation of commercial speech does not fail to directly advance the state's substantial
interest merely because it does not eradicate all the evils that offend that interest." Id.; see
also supra note 157 (noting the Ninth Circuit's reliance on underinclusiveness in Moser).
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generating profit through commercial telephone sales
messages.2°4
Finally, the court found that, because the statute imposed no blanket
restrictions on the use of ADADs and allowed their use when introduced
by a live operator, it was sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the
reasonable fit required by the fourth prong of Central Hudson.20 5
The second challenge to the Minnesota law was heard by the Eighth
Circuit in Van Bergen v. Minnesota.20 6 The Van Bergen court reviewed the
same statute at issue in Casino Marketing but applied a different test to
reach its determination that political, rather than commercial, speech was
restrained in that case.207 Finding exemptions within the statute to be
based on the type of relationship between the caller and consumer, not
based on content, the Eighth Circuit applied a time, place, or manner
analysis. 2 8 Applying the test, the court had no difficulty finding that the
Minnesota legislature had a substantial interest in limiting the use of
unsolicited ADAD calls.2°9 The court further held that due to the live
operator option and the availability of other methods of communicating
the message at issue, the statute was narrowly tailored and left open
ample alternative channels of communication. 210 Therefore, the court
upheld the statute as a constitutional time, place, or manner restriction
on speech.211
204 Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d at 890-91. For an analysis of restrictions on the use of
telemarketing by charitable organizations, see infra note 280.
205 Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d at 891. A dissenting opinion found that the statute failed
both the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson because calls introduced by live
operators intruded similarly on privacy and perhaps were more difficult to terminate by
the called party than calls placed directly by ADADs. Id. at 892 (Tomljanovich, J.,
dissenting). Because the regulation provided "only ineffective, remote support for the
government's purpose," the dissent felt the statute neither directly advanced the
government's interest in privacy nor possessed the required reasonable fit. Id.
206 59 F.3d 1541 (8th Cir. 1995).
207 Id. at 1553. The challenger in Van Bergen was a gubernatorial candidate who sought to
use ADADs as an inexpensive means of campaigning. Id. at 1546.
208 Id. at 1551, 1553 ("[T]he exceptions ... all rest on a single premise: that the caller has a
relationship with the subscriber implying the subscriber's consent to receive the caller's
communications.").
209 Id. at 1554-55 (finding telephone calls more intrusive than the door-to-door solicitation
problems addressed by the Supreme Court in Breard and Martin v. City of Struthers
"because the recipient must respond once to each caller" and cannot post a 'no solicitation'
sign on his phone).
210 Id. at 1555-56.
211 Id. at 1556.
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3. Bland v. Fessler
A telemarketer's First Amendment challenge to two California
ADAD statutes met a fate similar to the Minnesota challenges when
considered by the Ninth Circuit in Bland v. Fessler.212 These statutes,
similar to the Minnesota statute, essentially prohibited the use of ADADs
unless first introduced by a live operator who has obtained the
consumer's consent to play the message.213 One statute, "the utilities
statute," regulated all users of ADADs, while the other, "the civil
statute," was directed only at prohibiting business uses of ADADs as
unfair or deceptive practices. 214
Turning first to the utilities statute, the court, following the lead of
its opinion in Moser and that of the Eighth Circuit in Van Bergen, applied
a time, place, or manner test.215 Finding the statute's exceptions to be
based not on content, but on some pre-existing relationship that implied
consent to receive ADAD calls, the court found the statute to be content
neutral.216 Next, consistent with all other courts so far cited, the court
found California's interest in protecting its citizens' privacy to be
significant.217 Finally, the court found that the statute was narrowly
tailored in that no less restrictive means were "readily apparent" and
that the statute left ample alternative channels of communication open to
disseminate messages.21 8
Turning to the civil statute, the court employed Central Hudson
because only commercial speech was restrained by the regulation.219
212 88 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 1996). The statutes are: CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770(a)(22) (West 1998)
(the "civil statute"); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2871-2876 (West 1994) (the "utilities statute").
213 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770(a)(22)(A); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2874. Exceptions were made
by the utilities statute for, inter alia, calls between parties with existing business
relationships, calls made by nonprofit organizations to their members, calls made by
schools reporting attendance problems, calls made by utility companies reporting service
problems or emergencies, or calls made by public safety officials. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §
2872. California's statute is unique in that consumers can expressly consent to receive calls
made by any ADADs. Id. § 2873.
214 Bland, 88 F.3d at 738.
215 Id. at 733.
216 Id. For a list of the pre-existing relationships, see supra note 213.
217 Bland, 88 F.3d at 734.
218 Id. at 736-37. The court specifically addressed the prospect of establishing a state-wide
"do-not-call" list and found such an alternative less attractive as it placed the burden on the
public rather than the telemarketer and because it forced citizens to make an "all or nothing
choice" about receiving pre-recorded messages. Id. at 736.
219 Id. at 738-39.
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Importing its reasoning from the analysis of the utilities statute, the court
quickly concluded that the state interest again was substantial and that
the regulation possessed the "reasonable fit" necessary under the test.220
D. Effect of Precedent on Future Challenges to Telemarketing Regulation
In reviewing constitutional challenges to both federal and state
telemarketing regulations to date, it is clear that courts are quite willing,
and perhaps even anxious, to uphold such legislation.221 In virtually
every facial challenge to the constitutionality of a telemarketing
regulation, the regulation has been upheld.' The only major exceptions
are Lysaght and the district court opinion in Moser, which was later
overruled by the Ninth Circuit.223
One initial difficulty in synthesizing these cases is that the courts,
analyzing differing statutes, have applied different tests to judge their
constitutionality. 224 Courts viewing the challenged statute as drawing
content-based distinctions between telemarketers, such as the Lysaght
court and the district court in Moser, have applied the Central Hudson
test.225  However, courts viewing distinctions made between
telemarketers as content neutral, such as the Szefczek court and the Ninth
Circuit in Moser, have applied either Central Hudson or the time, place, or
220 Id. at 739.
221 See Cox, supra note 119, at 419. Indeed, a wide variety of telemarketing regulations
have been upheld against constitutional and other challenges. See generally Zitter, supra
note 120. For example, a West Virginia statute banning telephone solicitation of pre-need
funeral services was upheld under Central Hudson. Nat'l Funeral Serv., Inc. v. Rockefeller,
870 F.2d 136, 144-46 (4th Cir. 1989). Likewise, annual fee and bonding requirements for
telemarketers have been found constitutional. Erwin v. Nevada, 908 P.2d 1367, 1370-71
(Nev. 1995). Prohibitions on telephone solicitation by medical providers have also been
upheld due to the substantial government interest in regulating the medical profession.
Desnick v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 665 N.E.2d 1346, 1356-60 (Ill. 1996). Telemarketing
regulations singling out specific businesses have also been upheld against equal protection
challenges. Erwin, 908 P.2d at 1372-73 (upholding fee and bonding requirements for
telemarketers engaged in sports information services). But see Tex. State Troopers Ass'n v.
Morales, 10 F. Supp. 2d 628, 636 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that provisions of the Texas Law
Enforcement Telephone Solicitation Act, which created disclosure requirements applying
only to charitable organizations run by law enforcement agencies, violated the equal
protection clause).
222 See supra Part III.B-C.
M2 See supra Part III.B-C.
224 See Cox, supra note 119, at 419-20.
225 See supra notes 147-48 and 188-89 and accompanying text.
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manner test.226 However, it has been observed that the two tests are
substantially similar, demanding essentially the same requirements of
restrictions on speech.227 Under either approach, the government must
demonstrate that the challenged regulation is designed to protect a
substantial or significant state interest.2  Similarly, each test imposes a
"reasonable fit" requirement between the government's ends and the
means used to achieve those ends.229
The significant government interest requirement appears to pose no
obstacle to telemarketing legislation. No court analyzing a telemarketing
regulation to date has failed to find that the regulation was designed to
serve a substantial government interest.230 By far, the courts have
consistently found the government's interest in protecting the privacy of
226 See Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying the time, place, or manner
test); Szefczek v. Hillsborough Beacon, 668 A.2d 1099, 1106 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995)
(applying Central Hudson). Understandably, where the challenged statute clearly restricts
only commercial speech, the courts have applied Central Hudson. See Bland v. Fessler, 88
F.3d 729, 738-39 (9th Cir. 1996) (analyzing the "civil statute"); Destination Ventures Ltd. v.
FCC, 844 F. Supp. 632, 637 (D. Or. 1994); Minnesota v. Casino Mktg. Group Inc., 491
N.W.2d 882, 886-87 (Minn. 1992). Likewise, when noncommercial speech is restrained by a
telemarketing statute, Central Hudson is inapplicable and a time, place, or manner analysis
is used by the courts so long as the restriction is content neutral. See Bland, 88 F.3d at 733
(analyzing the "utilities statute"); Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1553 (8th Cir.
1995).
227 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.16 (1987)
(stating that the Central Hudson and the time, place, or manner tests were "substantially
similar" because both tests require a balancing of the governmental interest against the
magnitude of the restriction on speech); Moser, 46 F.3d at 973 ("[Wie note that the tests for
time, place, and manner restrictions for content-neutral speech and regulations for
commercial speech regulations are essentially identical."); see also Cox, supra note 119, at
419. But see supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit's
reversal in Moser which suggests that Central Hudson and the time, place, or manner
analysis can reach different results on the same facts).
M See Cox, supra note 119, at 420. The second prong of the Central Hudson test inquires
whether a substantial government interest has been asserted to justify the restriction on
speech. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Under the time, place, or manner
analysis, the restrictions on speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest. See supra note 70.
M See supra notes 84 and 152 (discussing Central Hudson's "reasonable fit" requirement).
The "reasonable fit" requirement of the time, place, or manner test is found in its second
prong, which requires that the speech regulation be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest. See supra note 70.
230 See Bland, 88 F.3d at 734, 739; Van Bergen, 59 F.3d at 1554-55; Moser, 46 F.3d at 974;
Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1167 (S.D. Ind. 1997); Destination Ventures, 844 F.
Supp. at 637; Lysaght v. New Jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646, 649 (D.N.J. 1993); Moser v. FCC, 826
F. Supp. 360, 364 (D. Or. 1993); Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d at 888-89; Szefczek, 668 A.2d at
1108.
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the home from the intrusions posed by telemarketing to be the most
compelling interest proffered.231  Other interests, such as fraud
prevention and efficiency in business administration, have also been
suggested as justifying restrictions on telemarketing.232 However, none
has been found to be as persuasive as the privacy argument.233
Given the degree to which it is discussed in the preceding cases, the
apparent key to the constitutionality of telemarketing regulation seems
to lie in its "reasonable fit" within the meaning of Central Hudson and
subsequent cases spelling out this requirement.234 The main inquiry
under this prong of Central Hudson is whether government, in drafting
its legislation, has been careful to choose means that directly advance its
ends. 235 In examining the cases to date, it appears that the only
significant potential pitfall for telemarketing regulations under Central
Hudson arises when distinctions are made between the types of calls
made or when exemptions from regulation are made for some calls but
not others.236 This situation was critically examined in both the district
courts' opinions in Moser and in Lysaght where the challenged statutes
made distinctions between commercial and noncommercial calls and
between live and recorded telemarketing calls. 237 Both of these courts, in
striking down telemarketing legislation, found that the underinclusive
nature of the statutes did not directly advance the government's interest
in protecting privacy, thus failing Central Hudson.23 Therefore,
231 See Cox, supra note 119, at 420; see also supra text accompanying note 193.
232 See Cox, supra note 119, at 420; see also supra text accompanying note 193.
233 See Cox, supra note 119, at 420.
2 See Kenro, 962 F. Supp. at 1167-69; Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 637-39; Lysaght,
837 F. Supp. at 650-53; Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 365; Casino Mktg., 491 N.W. 2d at 890-993;
Szefczek, 668 A.2d at 1109; see also supra Part II.D (discussing the Supreme Court's most
recent cases applying the "reasonable fit" requirement).
235 See supra notes 84 and 152 (discussing the "reasonable fit" requirement).
236 Such distinctions were made by the statutes in both Moser (the district court opinion)
and Lysaght, the only precedents striking down telemarketing legislation under Central
Hudson. See supra notes.143-52 and 186-93 and accompanying text. The "reasonable fit"
requirement was also a source of debate between the majority and dissent in Casino Mktg.
See supra notes 202-205 and accompanying text.
237 See Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 651-52; Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 365-66.
2m See Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 651-52; Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 365-66. But see Casino Mktg.,
491 N.W.2d at 890 (finding exemptions made to telemarketing legislation to be allowable).
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Casino Marketing reasoned that that state's legislature was
free to find some types of telemarketing calls more problematic than others and to
eradicate some of the evils posed by telemarketing calls without eliminating all of them. Id.
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legislatures should be wary of including too many exemptions in
telemarketing legislation.239
At the same time, telemarketing regulations must not be
overinclusive. A blanket ban on all telemarketing would similarly run
afoul of Central Hudson's directive of a "reasonable fit" because it would
likely not be sufficiently narrowly tailored. 240 Such a ban would
proscribe too much speech, preventing those who actually wish to
receive telemarketing calls from being able to do So. 241 Therefore, any
future legislative efforts to restrict telemarketing should be wary of both
underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness. Legislatures should
endeavor to create statutes with limited exemptions that specifically
target privacy concerns, prohibiting telemarketing calls to those bothered
by them, while allowing those who wish to receive such calls to be able
to do so.
IV. ANALYZING THE FUTURE OF TELEMARKETING REGULATION: STATE "Do-
NOT-CALL" LEGISLATION IN LIGHT OF CENTRAL HUDSON
This Part examines potential First Amendment problems with the
latest embodiment of telemarketing legislation-state "do-not-call"
statutes. The Part begins by introducing "do-not-call" laws, the most
recent attempt by states to combat telemarketers. 242 Secondly, this Part
presents the basic problem with these statutes both from a consumer's
and a constitutional perspective: the exemptions placed within the
statutes by state legislatures. 243 Next, the Part briefly discusses Indiana's
"do-not-call" statute in light of these considerations. 244 Finally, the Part
discusses the First Amendment implications of the exemptions in light of
Central Hudson and the Court's most recent cases interpreting it.245
A. The "Do-Not-Call" Phenomenon
The most recent response to the problems associated with
telemarketing, and one that has the capacity to avoid overbreadth
problems by specifically targeting individuals bothered by the practice,
239 See infra Part IV.B.
240 See Cox, supra note 119, at 421.
241 Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 67 (discussing the value of commercial
speech to some in a free market economy).
242 See infra Part IV.A.
243 See infra Part IV.B.
244 See infra Part IV.C.
245 See infra Part IV.D.
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is the state "do-not-call" statute. 246 Such statutes, taking advantage of
the TCPA's "savings clause," which allows states to enact telemarketing
legislation that is more restrictive than the TCPA, authorize the state to
create a database of its citizens who have expressly objected to receiving
telemarketing calls.247 This "do-not-call" list is then compiled and must
246 See generally Cox, supra note 119, at 421 (discussing how privacy concerns might be
addressed by future telemarketing legislation); Shannon, supra note 135, at 408-11
(discussing the advent of state "do-not-call" statutes). Although only statewide "do-not-
call" lists presently exist, a national "do-not-call" database was considered and rejected by
the FCC in its 1992 report and order implementing the TCPA. In re Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 8761 (1992), 1992 WL
690928 [hereinafter FCC Rules]. In considering this option, the FCC concluded that a
nationwide database would be expensive as well as difficult to organize and maintain. Id.
at 8758 (citing estimates of between twenty and eighty million dollars in first-year
operating costs and twenty-million dollar estimates for succeeding years). Also
troublesome to the FCC was the fact that consumers would be forced to make "an all or
nothing choice [to] either reject all telemarketing calls, even those which the consumer
might wish to receive, or accept all telemarketing calls, including those which the
consumer does not wish to receive." Id. at 8759. Additionally, the FCC was concerned that
consumers would still be disappointed even if a nationwide database was compiled due to
timing considerations and exemptions that would exclude some businesses and
organizations. Id. at 8758-59. Furthermore, the FCC was concerned that such a database
would continually be out of date and that it would be difficult to protect, leading to
possible abuses by unscrupulous telemarketers. Id. at 8759. Therefore, the FCC
summarized: "In view of the many drawbacks of a national do-not-call database, and in
light of the existence of an effective alternative (company-specific do-not-call lists), we
conclude that this alternative is not an efficient, effective, or economic means of avoiding
unwanted telephone solicitations." Id. at 8761. But see Shannon, supra, note 135, at 397-98
(noting that one year after the TCPA's passage, a House subcommittee found company-
specific "do-not-call" lists to be less effective than envisioned and urged the adoption of a
nationwide "do-not-call" database). Shannon argues that a national "do-not-call" system
"may be the most uniform and cost-efficient way to reduce unwanted telemarketing calls."
Id. at 418. Perhaps due to the recent explosion of state "do-not-call" statutes, the federal
government has again begun investigating the possibility of establishing a national
database. Government Wants Telemarketing Limits, POST TRIB. (Porter Co., Ind.), Jan. 23, 2002,
at A9. The Federal Trade Commission is presently investigating the feasibility of a national
"do-not-call" list in addition to other regulations of the telemarketing industry. See
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/edcams/donotcall/index.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2002)
(soliciting comments on a proposal by the Federal Trade Commission to establish a
national "do-not-call" registry). Besides these actions taken by the Federal Trade
Commission, the FCC announced on September 12, 2002, that it, too, was seeking public
comment on the possibility of its involvement in the establishment of a national "do-not-
call" list. FCC Seeks Comment on Updating Telemarketing Rules, available at http://www.fcc.
gov (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
247 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19C-2(b)(1) (Supp. 2001); see also Markon, supra note 10, at 1D
(explaining the operation of "do-not-call" statutes). Generally, state residents must
telephone, write, or e-mail the enacting state's attorney general, a consumer protection
agency, or other third party in order to be placed on the "do-not-call" list. Id. For a
statement of the TCPA's savings clause, 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1) (2000), see supra note 134 and
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usually be purchased on a regular basis by telemarketers seeking to do
business in that state.248 Some sort of sanction, generally a fine, is
provided by statute for any calls placed by telemarketers to numbers
appearing on the "do-not-call" list.249 In essence, "do-not-call" statutes
attempt to erect virtual no solicitation signs on telephone numbers much
like signs erected to combat the problem of door-to-door solicitation
addressed in Breard.250
"Do-not-call" statutes have become extremely popular in recent
years, with at least seventeen states passing a version in some form or
another.251  These states include Alabama 5 2 Alaska,253 Arkansas, 254
accompanying text. Different states enacting "do-not-call" statutes have placed a variety of
state agencies in charge of administering the database. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-99-404
(Michie Supp. 2001) (placing the attorney general's office in charge of establishing and
maintaining the database); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-905 (West Supp. 2002) (naming the
state's public utilities commission as administrator); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-288a(b)
(West Supp. 2002) (placing the state department of consumer protection in charge of the
"do-not-call" list).
248 Markon, supra note 10, at ID.
249 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.059(8) (West Supp. 2002) (authorizing both injunctive
relief and a civil penalty of $10,000.00 per violation).
250 See Shannon, supra note 135, at 394.
251 See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Do-Not-Call Statutes, at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/CIP/donotcall.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2002).
Besides true "do-not-call" statutes, this site lists the statutes of several states that follow the
TCPA's approach of requiring each telemarketing company to maintain its own company-
specific "do-not-call" list. Id. While these statutes are beyond the scope of this Note, they
are as follows: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1278(B)(2)(c) (West Supp. 2001); HAw. REV.
STAT. § 481P-4(11) (Supp. 2001); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 413/15(3) (West Supp. 2002);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1499 (West 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-1212 (1999); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 48:17-25 (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-61-3.5 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-
445(E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 55.151 (Vernon 1998). Id. Note
that between the original completion of this Note and its submission for publication, seven
additional states-Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin-enacted "do-not-call" laws. 2002 Ill. Legis. Serv. 92-795 (West) (effective Aug. 9,
2002); 2002 Kan. Sess. Laws 179 (adopted May 29, 2002); 2002 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 265
(West) (effective Jan. 1, 2003); 2002 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 367 (West) (adopted May 15,
2002); 2002 Okla. Sess. Laws 72 (effective Jan. 1, 2003); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2242-
2245.2 (West 2002) (effective June 2, 2002); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 100.52 (West Supp. 2002)
(effective Jan. 1, 2003).
252 ALA. CODE §§ 8-19C-2 to 8-19C-12 (Supp. 2001) (effective July 1, 2000). Alabama
charges its residents a fee for inclusion in the database. Id. § 8-19C-3. Violations can be
remedied by an action brought either by the state or by the consumer. Id. §§ 8-19C-6, 8-
19C-7. Injunctive relief and damages of $2,000.00 per violation are the statutorily-
prescribed remedies. Id.
253 ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.475 (Michie 2000) (effective Nov. 4, 1996). Rather than authorize
the state to create a "do-not-call" database, the Alaska statute provides that those who do
not wish to receive telemarketing calls will be identified in some manner in the local
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California,255 Colorado,256 Connecticut,257 Florida,258 Georgia, 259 Idaho, 260
Kentucky, 261 Louisiana, 262  Missouri,26 3  New York,264  Oregon, 265
telephone directories, essentially placing the burden of operating the system on the
telephone companies. Id. § 45.50.475(a)-(b). This approach would seem to create particular
difficulties in maintaining an accurate listing and also in addressing the time lag between
the date that telephone consumers express their preference not to receive telemarketing
calls and the date the next telephone directory is published. See generally FCC Rules, supra
note 246, at 8758-59.
254 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-99-404 to 4-99-408 (Michie Supp. 2001) (effective Jan. 1, 2000).
The Arkansas statute requires the consumer to pay a $10.00 initial fee and thereafter a $5.00
annual fee for inclusion in the database. Id. § 4-99-404(2)(B). No civil remedy is provided
by the statute. Instead, violations are pursued by the attorney general's office as a violation
of the state's deceptive trade practices act. Id. § 4-99-407.
255 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17590-17595 (West Supp. 2002) (effective Jan. 1, 2003). The
California statute is unique in that it allows the telephone consumer to allow certain
telephone calls specifically identified by the consumer while disallowing all other
telemarketing calls. Id. § 17591(b). This provision obviates one concern the FCC identified
as a drawback to "do-not-call" lists-requiring the consumer to make an "all or nothing
choice" between telemarketing calls. See FCC Rules, supra note 246, at 8759. California's
statute also prescribes a sliding-scale fee for purchase of the list by telemarketers. CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17591(c). Larger companies with over 1,000 employees must pay the
full fee while telephone solicitors with fewer than five employees are not required to pay a
fee for the list. Id.
2M COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-1-901 to 6-1-908 (West Supp. 2002) (effective Aug. 8, 2001).
As do several other "do-not-call" statutes, the Colorado statute provides affirmative
defenses against enforcement of the act if the telemarketing agency has established and
implemented rules and procedures to comply with the act, or if the violation is a result of a
technical mistake. Id § 6-1-906.
257 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-288a (West Supp. 2002) (effective Jan. 1, 2001).
258 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.059 (West Supp. 2002) (effective July 1, 1997). In addition to
standard "do-not-call" list requirements, the Florida statute sets forth specific requirements
for contracts made pursuant to telemarketing calls, presumably as a method of fraud
prevention. Id. § 5(a)-(c).
259 GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-27 (Supp. 2002) (effective July 1, 1998). For legislative history
information and a review of the Georgia Act's provisions, see Kristine G. Visage, Recent
Statute, Telephone and Telegraph Service; O.C.G.A. § 46-5-27 (1998), 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 209
(1998).
260 IDAHO CODE § 48-1003A (Michie Supp. 2002) (effective Jan. 1, 2001).
261 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.46955(15) (Banks-Baldwin 2002) (effective July 15, 1998).
Rather than imposing civil sanctions, the Kentucky statute makes violations of its "do-not-
call" statute misdemeanor criminal offenses. Id. § 367.46999.
262 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:844.1145:844:15 (West Supp. 2002) (effective May 24, 2001).
263 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.1095-407.1107 (West 2001) (effective July 1, 2001). As do
several other "do-not-call" statutes, the Missouri statute expressly contemplates the FCC's
creation of a national "do-not-call" database pursuant to the authority granted it by the
TCPA. Id. § 407.1101(3). Were the FCC to do so, the Missouri statute authorizes its own
inclusion in the national database. Id. For information concerning the FCC's consideration
of a national "do-not-call" statute, see FCC Rules, supra note 246.
264 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 399-z (McKinney Supp. 2001) (effective Apr. 1, 2002). Unique to
the New York law, violations are not brought either by state officials or private consumers
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Tennessee, 266 and Texas. 267 The vast majority of these laws have taken
effect only within the past two years. 268 The momentum for these laws
continues to build as several other states contemplate similar
legislation.269 Presently, a visit to almost any state legislature's official
web page will confirm that a "do-not-call" statute is under
consideration.270  This phenomenon seems to be at least partly
attributable to national displeasure, if not contempt, for the
telemarketing industry and the resulting attempt by politicians to garner
credit for impeding it.271 Also responsible are frustrations with existing
as civil actions. Id. § 6. Rather, violation proceedings are treated as administrative in
nature, and the violator may be fined up to $2,000.00 by the state's consumer protection
board. Id.
265 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.574 (1999) (effective 1999; amended May 22, 2001).
266 TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-4-405 (Supp. 2001) (effective May 17, 2000).
267 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 43.001-43.253 (Vernon Supp. 2002) (effective Jan. 1,
2002). The Texas statute exempts five different types of telemarketing calls from the
provisions of its "do-not-call" statute. Id. § 43.003. Exempted are calls made in response to
a consumer's inquiry, in connection with an "established business relationship," to a
business, to collect a debt, or by a state licensee such as a real estate or insurance agent. Id.
268 Shannon, supra note 135, at 409.
269 See Savoye, supra note 3, at 2 (reporting that as of December 2000, twenty-seven states
were considering "do-not-call" legislation); see also Richard Roesler, Bills Target Telephone
Solicitors, THE SPOKESMAN REV., Jan. 24, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 7044834 (reporting
that legislators in the State of Washington were considering five separate anti-
telemarketing bills).
270 See, e.g., http://www.michiganlegislature.org (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) (indicating
that the State of Michigan is considering four separate "do-not-call" bills); http://www.
legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=124 HB 199 (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) (indicating that
a "do-not-call" bill was introduced in the Ohio Legislature in April 2001); http://egis.
state.nm.us/session0l.asp?chamber=s&type=++&number=220 (last visited Sept. 29, 2002)
(outlining Senate Bill 220, a "do-not-call" bill introduced in the first session of the 2001
New Mexico Legislature by Rep. Feldman); http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WUO1/LI/BI/
BT/2001/0/HB1469P3478.HTM (last visited Sept. 29, 2002) (reporting an amended bill
under consideration by the Pennsylvania General Assembly); http://www.leg.wa.gov/
pub/billinfo/2001-02/House/1600-1624/1600_01302001.txt (last visited Sept. 29, 2002)
(outlining a proposed "do-not-call" bill in the State of Washington).
271 See Kaplan, supra note 4, at Al; Markon, supra note 10, at 2 (discussing the disdain of
Americans for telemarketing). One journalist, in blaming the rise of telemarketing for a
variety of societal ills, described her satisfaction with the Missouri "do-not-call" statute in
the following manner:
What thrills me most is the satisfaction of knowing that a limitation
can be placed on some of the nuisances and irritations that we have
been forced to accept as commonplace. I've always resented the fact
that I have to pay a monthly bill for a telephone that I had installed for
my personal convenience and then have it usurped by people I don't
want to be in communication with.
Rose M. Nolen, Rude Awakening Telemarketers Rang in this Era of Incivility, ST. LOuIS POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 21, 2001, at B3, available at 2001 WL 4440204. Displeasure with the
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attempts to curb telemarketing and a widespread belief among
consumers that federal efforts at regulating the industry have been
ineffective. 272 As a result, telephone consumers have rushed to take
advantage of these laws wherever they have been enacted.273 However,
due to exemptions placed within the statutes by state legislatures, not all
"do-not-call" statutes afford the same degree of protection from
unsolicited telemarketing calls. 274
telemarketing industry has reportedly been on the rise. See Resler, Measure Has a Nice Ring
to It, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 4, 2000, at 10A, available at 2000 WL 26099517 (noting
that, in Wisconsin, telemarketing complaints to state consumer protection officials ranked
29th in volume among all written complaints in 1997, climbed to 7th in 1999, and appeared
certain to be included in the top five in 2000); see also Roesler, supra note 269, at Al (quoting
a Washington legislator who felt that interest in legislation aimed at reducing
telemarketing was increasing due to rising consumer frustration).
272 Shannon, supra note 135, at 408; see also Cox, supra note 119, at 406 (noting that, under
the TCPA's company-specific "do-not-call" solution, all telemarketers can in theory "get
you once" until a request is made that the company remove your name from its calling list).
Dissatisfaction with the TCPA's company-specific "do-not-call" list approach is not limited
to legal commentators. According to one journalist,
["Do-not-call"] laws have spread in response to rising complaints
about telemarketers, whose ranks have swelled because of economic
growth and declining long-distance phone rates. Another factor is
dissatisfaction with a 1994 federal law that requires individual
telemarketers to keep a list of consumers who say they don't want to
be called by them again. Unlike the state laws, the weaker federal law
requires consumers to tell the telemarketers directly of their
disinterest. The federal law also contains numerous exemptions and
allows a company to escape fines of up to $10,000 if it can show that it
trained its personnel and any subsequent call was an undefined 'error.'
Markon, supra note 10, at 1D.
273 Shannon, supra note 135, at 410; Markon, supra note 10, at 1D (noting that more than
1.6 million people had signed up for "do-not-call" lists in thirteen different states including
20,000 in a single day in Missouri and 368,000 New York residents in a two-month period);
Savoye, supra note 3, at 2 (reporting that 110,000 Missouri residents signed up for the "do-
not-call" list during the first week of registration alone and that residents of bordering
states also sought to be included on the list).
274 Shannon, supra note 135, at 408. Besides exemptions within the statutes, Shannon also
cites lack of enforcement of the statutes by various states as a potential weakness of "do-
not-call" statutes. Id. This lack of enforcement varies by state; for instance, Alaska has not
imposed any fines on telemarketers since passage of its law in 1996. Markon, supra note 10,
at 1D. Policy in the State of Arkansas, which also has not fined anyone, is to allow violators
eight to ten unpunished infractions before imposing any sanctions. Id. The State of
Florida, which could by law collect $10,000.00 per violation, settles infractions it chooses to
punish for $1,000.00. Id. But see Russell Gold, Call-Blocking Laws Bring Added Revenue,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2001, at B1l, available at 2001WL-WSJ 29680521 (stating that Missouri
has collected nearly half a million dollars in fines from violators since its statute took
effect); Sherri Buri McDonald, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Jan. 3, 2001, at 1, available at
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B. Exemptions
Despite the explicit desire of consumers registering for state "do-not-
call" statutes to receive no telemarketing calls of any kind, state statutes
enacted to date have frequently been heavily layered with exemptions
for various types of telemarketing calls.275  Most often, this is
accomplished by excluding the favored types of telemarketing calls from
the statute's definition of telephone solicitation.276  However, such
exemptions are also made by simply excluding certain telephone
solicitations from application of the statute at its outset.277
Some of the common exemptions made by various "do-not-call"
statutes, on their face, appear less objectionable than others. For
instance, it seems difficult to object to allowing calls made in response to
an express request of the telephone consumer,278 those made to conduct
2001 WL 2835522 (reporting two different "enforcement sweeps" conducted by the Oregon
Attorney General's office against thirty-five companies violating the state's "do-not-call"
law).
275 See Shannon, supra note 135, at 411; Michael Booth, Group to Push Call-Block Measure
Legislation Targets Telemarketers, DENVER POST, Jan. 13, 2001, at A01, available at 2001 WL
6740370 (noting that consumers in states where "do-not-call" statutes have been enacted
have complained that the laws are "full of holes," which allow too many telemarketing
calls to be placed).
276 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-903(b) (West 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.059(c)
(West Supp. 2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.1095(3) (West 2001). The Missouri statute
excludes the following types of calls from its definition of telephone solicitation
communications:
(a) To any residential subscriber with that subscriber's prior express
invitation or permission;
(b) By or on behalf of any person or entity with whom a residential
subscriber has had a business contact within the past one hundred
eighty days or a current business or personal relationship;
(c) By or on behalf of any entity organized pursuant to Chapter
501(c)(3) of the United States Internal Revenue Code, while such entity
is engaged in fundraising to support the charitable purpose for which
the entity was established provided that a bona fide member of such
exempt organization makes the voice communication;
(d) By or on behalf of any entity over which a federal agency has
regulatory authority to the extent that:
a. Subject to such authority, the entity is required to maintain a license,
permit or certificate to sell or provide the merchandise being offered
through telemarketing; and
b. The entity is required by law or rule to develop and maintain a no-
call list ....
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.1095(3).
277 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-99406 (Michie 2002).
278 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-288a(a) (West Supp. 2002).
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polls, 279 or perhaps even calls made by charitable organizations. 280 On
the other hand, exemptions for car dealers, 281 funeral establishments, 282
279 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-903(10)(b)(VI).
280 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.475(g)(3)(B)(ii) (Michie 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-
27(b)(3)(C) (Supp. 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-4-401(6)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2001). United States
Supreme Court precedents suggest that exemptions for charitable organizations would be
treated differently than other "do-not-call" statute exemptions should a First Amendment
challenge be brought. See, e.g., Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947,
959-62 (1984); Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). In
Schaumberg, the Court considered a city ordinance regulating the percentage of funds
collected by charitable organizations that was to be used toward charitable, not
administrative purposes. 444 U.S. at 624 n.4. The city in Schaumberg argued that charitable
solicitation was similar to a business proposition and, therefore, constituted commercial
speech deserving of lesser First Amendment protections. Id. at 628. The Court, however,
rejected that premise and held that charitable solicitations "involve a variety of speech
interests . . . that are within the protection of the First Amendment ... [and, therefore,
have] not been dealt with as purely commercial speech." Id. at 632. The Court then,
applying strict scrutiny, invalidated the ordinance as not sufficiently narrowly tailored. Id.
at 635-39. The Court followed this line of reasoning in Riley v. National Federation of the
Blind. 487 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1988). The statute challenged in that case, among other
requirements, required professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the
percentage of funds collected by the organization during the previous year that were
actually used for charitable purposes. Id. at 786. The government defended the
requirement compelling speech by asserting that it regulated only the commercial
fundraiser's profit from the solicited contribution. Id. at 795. The government, therefore,
suggested that a commercial speech analysis was appropriate. Id. The Court declined this
invitation, however, stating, "[W]e do not believe that the speech retains its commercial
character when it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech ....
Therefore, we apply our test for fully protected expression." Id. at 796 (citations omitted).
Applying "exacting First Amendment scrutiny," the Court thereafter invalidated the
statute. Id. at 798. These cases make clear that if no exemption is made for charitable
organizations in a "do-not-call" statute, strict scrutiny will be applied in a First
Amendment challenge. Id. at 796; Schaumberg, 444 U.S. at 632. Applying similar reasoning,
a few courts have invalidated telemarketing restrictions placed on charitable organizations.
See Tex. State Troopers Ass'n v. Morales, 10 F. Supp. 2d 628, 637 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Optimist
Club v. Riley, 563 F. Supp. 847, 850 (E.D.N.C. 1982); Planned Parenthood League v.
Attorney Gen., 464 N.E.2d 55, 62 (Mass. 1984). Perhaps recognizing these precedents,
several states have exempted charitable organizations from the provisions of their "do-not-
call" statutes. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-288a(a)(6)(B) (excluding "tax-exempt
nonprofit organization[s]"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:844.12(4)(d) (West Supp. 2002)
(excluding nonprofit organizations that do not employ the services of professional
telemarketers). Colorado makes explicit references to First Amendment considerations in
exempting charitable organizations in its "do-not-call" statute. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-
1-902(1)(d) (West 2002) ("Although charitable ...organizations are exempt from the
provisions of this [statute] because of considerations of freedom of speech, the general
assembly encourages such organizations to voluntarily comply with this [statute] when
possible."). However, the state interest in adopting "do-not-call" legislation is compelling.
See supra notes 118 and 230-31 and accompanying text. Further, by limiting the application
of "do-not-call" statutes only to those who have expressed a desire to receive no telephone
solicitations, "do-not-call" statutes are inherently narrowly tailored. See, e.g., Riley, 487 U.S.
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telephone companies, 283 book clubs, 284 real estate agents, 285 and insurance
salesmen 2 6 seem to defy the purpose of enacting the statutes. Some
statutes even allow telemarketing calls that attempt to arrange in-home
sales presentations rather than concluding business over the telephone,
inviting further intrusion into the home.287 Another common exemption
is made for calls to consumers with a "pre-existing" business
relationship, an often ill-defined term that would seem to authorize a
bevy of otherwise-silenced telemarketing calls.28 8 The dividing line
between who is granted an exemption and who is not is so seemingly
at 799 n.l (discussing the narrowly-tailored requirement in strict scrutiny analysis). States
may make the statutes further narrowly tailored by allowing consumers to determine
whether calls from charitable organizations are still desired despite their registration on the
state's "do-not-call" list. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17591(b) (West Supp. 2002). Besides
the state's interest in protecting the privacy of its residents, the consumers registering for
"do-not-call" lists are, in a sense, asserting their right not to speak, a right recognized by
the Court. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); West Va. St. Bd. of Ed. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943). Despite the obstacles presented by strict scrutiny,
perhaps "do-not-call" legislation, due to the strength of the government interests involved
and the narrow tailoring of the statutes, could join the Court's other precedents to survive
such stringent analysis. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding prohibition
on distribution of campaign literature near polling place under strict scrutiny review);
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding prior restraint on publication of
book by former CIA employee under strict scrutiny).
281 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-99-406(2).
282 See, e.g., id. § 4-99406(8).
283 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.1095(3)(d) (West 2001).
284 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.46951(2)(d)(14) (Banks-Baldwin 2002).
285 See, e.g., id. § 367.46951(2)(d)(4).
286 See, e.g., id. § 367.46951(2)(d)(6).
287 See, e.g., id. § 367.46951(2)(d)(15); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 399z(1)(j)(iv) (McKinney Supp.
2002) (exempting calls made "in which the sale of goods and services is not completed, and
payment or authorization of payment is not required, until after a face-to-face sales
presentation by the telemarketer or a meeting between the telemarketer and customer").
2m See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.059(1)(c)(3) (West Supp. 2002) (authorizing calls made
"[t]o any person with whom the telephone solicitor has a prior or existing business
relationship" but leaving the terms undefined); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-27(b)(3)(B) (Supp.
2001); IDAHO CODE § 48-1003A(4)(b) (Michie Supp. 2002) (authorizing all calls made where
an "established business relationship exists" but specifically excluding calls under this
exemption made by a telephone company to a telephone subscriber). Linda Goldstein, a
New York City lawyer who represents telemarketers, argues that "[tihere are very valid
and legitimate reasons why a business would want to contact its existing customers and
why a customer would want to hear from a business it has a relationship with" even if the
customer is on a "do-not-call" list. Markon, supra note 10, at 1D. However, "the practical
effect of the exemption in many states is that consumers can be called by any company-or
even a unit of a larger corporation-from which they have ever bought products or
services." Id.
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arbitrary and unfair as to call the legitimacy of many "do-not-call"
statutes into doubt.289
Such exemptions are frequently the product of heavy lobbying by
the telemarketing industry itself or other organizations such as insurers,
real estate agents, and stockbrokers that are able to exert pressure on
state legislatures. 290  Representatives shepherding "do-not-call" bills
through state legislatures must often make compromises that weaken the
ultimate law in order to pass any legislation at all. 291 These exemptions
have the effect of disappointing the expectations of consumers who
believe that they will be free from telemarketing calls upon their
inclusion in the "do-not-call" database.292
Depending upon their number and type, exemptions can potentially
reduce, and perhaps even eliminate, the effectiveness of "do-not-call"
statutes. 293 Some states have enacted "do-not-call" statutes that, despite
289 Savoye, supra note 3, at 2.
290 See id.; Bill Bell Jr., Missourians May Sign up for No-Call List to Block Some Telemarketers,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 2000, at B1, available at 2000 WL 3566312 (noting that
pressure from various companies fighting the restrictions created loopholes in the Missouri
statute). Indeed, telemarketing firms and businesses relying heavily on telephone
solicitation have been able to derail state efforts to enact "do-not-call" statutes in at least
two states. See Booth, supra note 275, at A01; Timothy B. Wheeler, Curb on Telemarketers
Dies in Senate Panel; 'Do-not-Call' List Opposed by Business, BALT. SUN, Feb. 23, 2000, at 1B,
available at 2000 WL 4859072 (reporting that a Maryland "do-not-call" bill that enjoyed
broad public support was derailed due to opposition by large businesses that threatened to
move their operations outside the state if the measure was passed). But see Kaplan, supra
note 4, at Al (noting that some telemarketers support "do-not-call" legislation). Ron
Weber, head of a large telemarketing company, finds no problem with the laws because
"[nlobody in [the telemarketing] business wants to call someone who doesn't want to be
called .... It's a waste of time for us, too." Id.; see also Ed Fanselow, Hoosiers May Put
Names on No-Call List, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 4, 2001, at D1 (quoting a chamber of
commerce official as saying that "[lI]egitimate businesses don't want to call people that
don't want to be called").
291 See Bell, Jr., supra note 290, at B1 (reporting that Rep. D.J. Davis, a co-sponsor of
Missouri's "do-not-call" law, had initially planned a much stronger bill but was forced to
make compromises resulting in exemptions to get any legislation approved).
292 See Markon, supra note 10, at 1D (noting that consumer enthusiasm for "do-not-call"
statutes is often unfounded due to the failure of the statutes to fulfill their promise).
Disappointing consumer expectations was a concern of the FCC when considering the
establishment of a nationwide "do-not-call" list and one reason this option was ultimately
rejected by the FCC. See FCC Rules, supra note 246, at 8758-59.
293 See Jim Bencivenga, Resolved: One, Two, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 4, 2001, at 11,
available at 2001 WL 3732806 (noting that "some ["do-not-call" statutes] are good, some
adequate, and some have so many loopholes as to be unenforceable"). According to Robert
Bulmash, president of Private Citizen Inc., a consumer advocacy group, "do-not-call" laws
"may reduce telemarketing fifteen or twenty percent, but they clearly have been gutted
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their exemptions, are still fairly protective of consumer privacy.294 For
instance, Idaho's "do-not-call" law contains a scant three exemptions for
calls made to business telephone numbers, where an established
business relationship exists, and by minors using telephone solicitations
to benefit a charitable purpose or organization. 295 Likewise, Tennessee
has a fairly strong "do-not-call" law, allowing exemptions only for calls
made with a telephone subscriber's express permission, those made by
members of a tax-exempt, nonprofit organization, and calls soliciting
existing customers.296 Unlike Idaho, Tennessee takes pains to carefully
describe the nature of the existing business relationship, excluding
telemarketing companies or businesses that make more than three
telephone solicitation calls per week, thus further strengthening the
law.
297
However, "do-not-call" statutes in other states are so diluted by
exemptions that one might question whether they eliminate any
telemarketing calls at all. 298 The Alabama statute, as a rather extreme
example, makes a staggering twenty-five exemptions to its "do-not-call"
law, making it the weakest statute enacted to date.299 Among the
with so many exemptions . . . [that] the reality is that these laws don't get the job done."
Markon, supra note 10, at 1D.
294 See Shannon, supra note 135, at 411.
295 IDAHO CODE §48-1003A(4) (Michie Supp. 2001). Idaho strengthened its "established
business relationship" exemptions by specifically prohibiting telephone companies from
benefiting by this exemption. Id. § 48-1003A(4)(b). However, the exemption is weakened
by leaving the term undefined. Id. For a discussion of the problems surrounding this type
of exemption, see supra note 288 and accompanying text.
29 TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-4-401(6)(B) (Supp. 2001).
297 Id. § 65-4-401(6)(B)(iii). Other states have similarly effective statutes. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 501.059(c) (West Supp. 2001) (containing four exemptions); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-
27(b)(3) (Supp. 2001) (making three exemptions similar to the Idaho and Tennessee
statutes); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 399-z(1)(j) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (providing four
exemptions); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.567-569 (1999) (making five exemptions). It has been
reported that Florida's statute, despite its exemptions, "eliminates 70% to 80% of unwanted
sales calls to Florida homeowners." Matt Moore, State Can Block Some Telemarketers-For a
Price, NEWS HERALD, Jan. 22, 1998, available at http://www.newsherald.com/archive/
local/tm012298.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2002).
298 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.46951(2) (Banks-Baldwin 2001) (exempting twenty-
two different types of telemarketing calls from its "do-not-call" statute).
299 ALA. CODE § 8-19A-4 (Supp. 2000). Although the "do-not-call" provisions themselves
are in section 8-19C-3, the definitions for that chapter are provided in a previous section.
See id. § 8-19A-3. Under the definition of "telephone solicitation" used in the "do-not-call"
statute is a reference to a list of statutorily-exempt callers listed in still another section of
the code. See id. 8-19A-3(17). The exemptions listed in section 8-19A-4 are, therefore,
applicable to the "do-not-call" statute as well as the section in which they appear.
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exemptions included in the statute are calls made by stockbrokers;
commodities dealers; persons selling newspaper subscriptions or cable
television services; book, video, or record clubs; banks; insurance agents;
telephone companies; telemarketing businesses, either licensed by the
state or that have conducted business under the same name for at least
one year; persons soliciting the sale of more than five-hundred dollars
worth of food; or those soliciting the sale of "an annual publication
comprised of a biographical compilation of notable and distinguished
individuals." 300
Similarly, Kentucky makes twenty-two separate exemptions to its
"do-not-call" statute.30 1 So ineffective is the Kentucky statute that,
according to one estimate, ninety-five percent of all business and
nonprofit organizations that place telemarketing calls within the state are
exempted from its "do-not-call" provisions.302 Other statutes, while not
nearly as business-friendly as those in Alabama or Kentucky, also make
several exemptions that dilute the laws' utility.303 The effectiveness of
"do-not-call" legislation appears to be a product of how broadly each
individual state is willing to extend its application.30 4
C. The Indiana "Do-Not-Call" Statute: Ind. Code § 24-4.7
One of the most recent additions to the "do-not-call" landscape is
Indiana's effort to restrict unsolicited telemarketing calls, Indiana Code
Section 244.7, which became effective on January 1, 2002.305 "Do-not-
call" legislation was previously introduced in two earlier sessions of the
Telephone interview with Sue Ellen Young, Counsel, Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n (Jan. 10,
2001).
3w ALA. CODE § 8-19A-4.
301 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.46951(2).
302 Shannon, supra note 135, at 403.
303 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-99-406 (Michie Supp. 2001) (making eight exemptions
including those for car dealers and funeral homes); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17952(e)
(West Supp. 2002) (listing seven exemptions).
304 Shannon, supra note 135, at 412.
305 IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.7 (West Supp. 2001). Although effective July 1, 2001, the
Indiana Attorney General's office was given until January 1, 2002 to have the "do-not-call"
list in operation. Id. The State of Indiana previously adopted laws restricting the use of
ADADs by telemarketers. Id. §§ 24-5-14-1 to 24-5-14-13. Another article regulates
telemarketers in general, prescribing registration requirements and fees and disclosure
requirements. Id. § 24-5-14-12.
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Indiana legislature.3 6 Heavy lobbying by the telemarketing industry,
exemptions contained in the earlier bills, and plans to charge state
residents for inclusion in the database ultimately led to the failure of
those bills. 30 7 However, "do-not-call" legislation was finally approved
by the 112th General Assembly in May 2001. 308
As in other states, the law has proven to be incredibly popular with
state residents who rushed to be placed on the "do-not-call" list.3° 9
Nearly 800,000 Indiana residents signed up by the registration deadline
for the first list, with over 360,000 numbers being added in the final week
before publication.310 In fact, public support for the law was so great that
the state firefighters' union, which had sought an injunction to prevent
the law from taking effect, dismissed its challenge in the face of public
opposition to its actions.311
306 Telephone Interview with Rep. Dale Sturtz (Jan. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Sturtz interview].
Rep. Sturtz was the sponsor or co-sponsor of all three "do-not-call" bills introduced to the
Indiana General Assembly. Id.
307 Jennifer Wagner, 'Do not call' Bill Targets National Telemarketers, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Jan. 12, 2001, at A01 (citing exemptions and fees as reasons for the demise of one bill);
Stuart A. Hirsch & R. Joseph Gelarden, Session Ends in Limbo, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 4,
2000, at A01 (reporting that the telemarketing lobby, as well as exemptions and fee
requirements, were to blame for a prior "do-not-call" bill's failure). Sign up fees were a
particular defect in an earlier bill, regarded by members of the House Rules and Legislative
Procedures Committee as a "tax on the right to privacy." Hirsch & Gelarden, supra.
308 The Indiana General Assembly, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 6, 2001, at B03.
309 See Tim Logan, Phone Privacy List has Public Hanging on the Line[;] Stymied Callers Eager
to Ward off Telemarketers Must Show Persistence to Register, CallNet Advises, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, July 17, 2001, at A01, available at LEXIS, News Library, INSTAR File (reporting that
15,000 Hoosiers signed up during one five-day period). Consumer interest in the law
resulted in residents overwhelming operators hired by the state to register numbers for the
list. Id. One resident attempted to register by phone thirty-five times during a three-day
period and reached a message each time asking her to try again later. Id. Eventually, the
Attorney General introduced a web site to deal with consumer demand. See Mike
Redmond, Blunt Method Works Best on Telemarketers, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 7, 2001, at
E01, available at LEXIS, News Library, INSTAR File (reporting that the state had been
"swamped with people trying to get on the 'do not call' list" by telephone). The state's
website provides information about registration, obtaining the list, exemptions, and other
details regarding the law. See http://www.in.gov/attorneygeneral/telephoneprivacy (last
visited Sept. 28, 2002).
310 More Than 780,000 Residents Sign up for First No-Call List, AP NEWSWIRES, Dec. 13, 2001,
available at Westlaw, INNEWS Database.
311 Firefighters' Union Drops Lawsuit Against No-Call List, AP NEWSWIRES, Dec. 22, 2001,
available at Westlaw, INNEWS Database. The firefighter's union initially requested the
injunction due to concerns about the law's impact on its ability to raise funds through
telephone solicitations requesting donations. Id. But see Telemarketing Company Files Suit
Over No-Call List, THE TIMES (Porter Co., Ind.), Jan. 25, 2002, at A5 (reporting that two
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Indiana's "do-not-call" statute, also known as the Telephone Privacy
Law, takes several steps to reduce telemarketing-related problems within
the state.312 In addition to the no-call provisions, the statute attempts to
reduce telemarketing fraud by requiring written contracts for sales
completed over the telephone.313 The statute also mandates certain
disclosure requirements for all telemarketing calls made to state
residents, regardless of whether or not they are included in the state's
database.314
The "do-not-call" conditions of the Indiana statute are substantially
similar to those of other states.31 5  The statute first sets forth its
definitions and the duties of the attorney general's office in giving effect
to the law.316 The "do-not-call" proscription itself is found in chapter
four, section two of the article and provides that "[a] telephone solicitor
may not make or cause to be made a telephone sales call to a telephone
number if that telephone number appears in the most current quarterly
listing published by the [consumer protection division of the attorney
vacuum cleaner sales companies filed suit in Vanderburgh County, Indiana, Circuit Court,
challenging the Indiana "do-not-call" statute as being unconstitutional).
312 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.7-1-1 to 24-4.7-5-6 (West Supp. 2001).
313 Id. § 24-4.7-4-4(4)(b). The statute provides that "[a] contract made under a telephone
sales call is not valid and enforceable against a consumer unless the contract complies with
this section." Id. The statute specifies that contracts made over the telephone "must be
reduced to writing and signed by the consumer." Id. § 24-4.7-4-4(4)(c). Certain contracts
are specifically excluded by the statute's requirements such as those where the consumer is
allowed to return the goods purchased within one week without incurring any obligation.
Id.
314 Id. § 24-4.7-4-2 (requiring telemarketers to immediately disclose their true first and last
name and the name of the company they are soliciting for).
315 See supra Part IV.A.
316 IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.7-2 to 24-4.7-3. The statute defines "telephone sales call" as a
call made to solicit consumer goods or services, charitable contributions, or to obtain
information from a consumer for the direct solicitation of goods, services, or an extension
of credit. Id. § 24-4.7-2-9. The attorney general is directed to, inter alia, establish and
maintain a quarterly listing "of telephone numbers of Indiana consumers who request not
to be solicited by telephone." Id. § 244.7-3-1(a). Chapter three of the statute also provides
for updating of the listing, authorizes the attorney general to charge telemarketers a fee for
the listing and to contract with an agent to perform the duties under the article, and spells
out reporting requirements. Id. §§ 244.7-3-1 to 24-4.7-3-5. This chapter also authorizes the
attorney general's consumer protection division to investigate complaints received
regarding violations of the article. Id. § 24-4.7-3-3. The chapter requires an annual report
from the consumer protection division including the amount of fees deposited in the fund
authorized by the chapter, expenses incurred, total number of consumers on the listing,
and the number of telephone subscribers added to and removed from the listing each year.
Id. § 24-4.7-3-5. Finally, the consumer protection division is authorized to adopt rules
pursuant to section 4-22-2 of the code to implement the new statute. Id. § 24-4.7-3-7.
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general's office]." 317  Telemarketers who fail to comply with the law
commit a deceptive act, actionable by the attorney general.318 Although
no private remedy is authorized, the attorney general's office may seek
injunctive relief plus a civil penalty of $10,000 for a first violation and
$25,000 for each subsequent violation.319
Despite this announced protection from unwanted telemarketing
calls, Indiana's "do-not-call" law also contains exemptions that
ultimately dilute the law's benefit to telephone consumers. 320 The first
chapter of the law provides that the statute does not apply to calls made
in response to an express request of the consumer, calls made in
connection with an existing debt or contract where performance is not
complete, and calls made by volunteers or employees of tax-exempt
charitable organizations. 321  While these exemptions are perhaps
understandable, the chapter goes on to exclude calls made by real estate
agents, insurance agents, and those soliciting the sale of newspaper
subscriptions, exemptions that are less likely to be understood by those
who have registered for the no-call list.322
The exemptions in the Indiana law, similar to those made in other
states, are clearly the product of heavy lobbying of and compromise
between legislators. 23 As mentioned, the initial and obvious problem
317 Id. § 24-4.74-1.
318 Id. § 24-4.7-5-1.
319 Id. § 24-4.7-5-2. The attorney general may also seek any money obtained by the
telemarketer in violating the statute, plus reasonable costs in investigating and maintaining
the action, including reasonable attorney's fees. Id. §§ 24-4.7-5-2(3) to 24.4.7-5-2(6). The
statute provides that each telephone call made in violation of the article constitutes a
separate actionable violation. Id. § 244.7-5-2(2). Violations may only be pursued by the
attorney general and may only be brought in the Circuit or Superior Courts of Marion
County. Id. §§ 244.7-5-2,244.7-5-5.
320 See id. § 244.7-1-1 (listing six exemptions to Indiana's "do-not-call" statute). Attempts
to make additional exemptions to the Indiana "do-not-call" list are anticipated in future
legislative sessions. See Mike Smith, Reed, Carter Prepare Their Own Lobbying Campaigns, AP
NEWSWIREs, Dec. 31, 2001, available at Westlaw, INNEWS Database (reporting that the
Indiana Attorney General will attempt to prevent additional exemptions from being
included in the statute). In January 2002, Rep. Joe Harrison introduced legislation
proposing to add a "pre-existing business relationship" exemption to the Indiana "do-not-
call" statute. Sturtz interview, supra note 306.
321 IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.7-1-1(1) to (3) (thus excluding large telemarketing companies
soliciting on behalf of the charity). Certain disclosures are also required of the charitable
organization's solicitor under the statute. Id. § 24-4.7-1-1(3)(B).
3- Id. § 24-4.7-1-1(4) to (6).
323 Sturtz interview, supra note 306. Rep. Dale Sturtz, who co-sponsored the Indiana "do-
not-call" statute, reports that the primary reason for the exemptions in the law is lobbying
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presented by these exemptions is that they ultimately weaken the utility
of "do-not-call" statutes.324 However, a far more ominous problem with
the exemptions may be looming than mere concerns with effectiveness.
By including many and varied exemptions in their "do-not-call" statutes,
state legislatures may have run afoul of Central Hudson, raising concerns
about the constitutionality of the new laws.
D. Potential First Amendment Problems with "Do-Not-Call" Statute
Exemptions.
1. Problems with Central Hudson's Penultimate Prong
In making numerous and often nonsensical exemptions to "do-not-
call" laws, legislators in Indiana and other states appear to have paid
insufficient attention to Central Hudson and the way in which it has been
interpreted in recent years.325 "Do-not-call" statutes, as they have been
by the real estate, insurance, and newspaper industries. Id. Sturtz related that the "bottom
line is that compromises had to be made in order to get the bill to pass." Id; see also Thomas
Wyman, You're Really Serious About Having Dinner in Peace, Aren't You?, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Dec. 9, 2001, available at 2001 WL 31595584; supra notes 290-91 and accompanying
text. Reporting efforts by the Hoosier State Press Association, the state newspapers' lobby,
to obtain an exemption, Wyman quips that "[t]hese exceptions aren't laws Moses brought
down from Mount Sinai. Human beings-lawmakers-write this stuff." Wyman, supra.
Because between thirty and seventy percent of newspaper subscriptions and renewals are
the product of telemarketing, the lobby "went to work, talking senators into tacking on the
exemption for newspapers." Id. Rep. Sturtz apparently did not protest the change to the
bill, reportedly stating that "you don't fight with people who buy their ink by the barrel."
Id.
324 See supra note 291 and accompanying text. Initial reports indicated Indiana's "do-not-
call" law was relatively successful at preventing unwanted telemarketing calls during
initial days of operation. See Ruth Ann Krause, The State Can Shield Your Phone Number from
Telemarketers, POST TRIB. (Porter Co., Ind.), Jan. 20, 2002, at El (reporting fewer than 400
complaints were received by the attorney general's office from the 780,000 consumers
registered on the "do-not-call" list during the first nineteen days of the statute's
effectiveness); Some on Indiana No-Call List Still Receiving Telemarketing Calls, AP NEWSWIRES,
Jan. 9, 2002, available at Westlaw INNEWS database (reporting only seventy-nine formal
complaints received during the first eight days of the statute's operation).
325 Despite the exemptions placed within their "do-not-call" statutes, a few states have at
least acknowledged the potential for their statute to conflict with the First Amendment. See
ALA. CODE § 8-19C-1(6) (Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-902(d) (West Supp.
2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-5-27(a)(6) (Supp. 2001). Three states make essentially the same
legislative finding, conceding that they are entering the province of commercial speech by
enacting the telemarketing regulation. See ALA. CODE § 8-19C-1(6); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-1-902(d); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-5-27(a)(6). The Alabama and Georgia findings are almost
identical, reading: "[lindividuals' privacy rights and commercial freedom of speech can be
balanced in a way that accommodates both the privacy of individuals and legitimate
telemarketing practices." ALA. CODE § 8-19C-1(6); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 45-5-27(a)(6).
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enacted to date, seem to present the same problem identified by past
courts evaluating restrictions on telemarketing. 326  That is, due to
exemptions made for some calls but not others, the statutes are
underinclusive. 327 Indiana's statute, for example, exempts insurance
agents soliciting applications for insurance, while making its "do-not-
call" provisions fully applicable to dentists and other professionals who
would advertise their services by telephone. 328  Employees of a
newspaper are free under the statute to solicit new and renewed
subscriptions, while publishers of magazines or books have been
proscribed from doing so, at least to those residents appearing on the
"do-not-call" list.329
This problem of underinclusiveness was identified by the district
court of Oregon in Moser and by the district court of New Jersey in
Lysaght.330 In evaluating the challenged telemarketing regulations, both
of those courts found that distinctions made by the regulations were
inconsistent with, and, therefore, did not directly advance the
"Do-not-call" statutes would be properly analyzed under Central Hudson rather than the
time, place, or manner analysis, as that test requires content neutrality. See supra note 70
(discussing the requirements of the test). Whether a certain phone call is prohibited by a
"do-not-call" statute or not can only be determined by the content or purpose of the phone
call, thus requiring a Central Hudson analysis. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.7-2-9
(defining the types of calls prohibited to consumers on the "do-not-call" list).
326 See supra notes 147-52, 191-93, and 205 and accompanying text (reporting the
observations of the Moser district court, the Lysaght court, and a dissenting opinion in
Casino Marketing on underinclusiveness in telemarketing regulations).
327 For a statement of the problem of underinclusiveness, see CI-EMERINSKY, supra note
29, at 647 (stating that a law is underinclusive "if it does not apply to individuals who are
similar to those to whom the law applies"). "Do-not-call" statutes would not appear to
present an overinclusiveness or overbreadth problem since they are only applicable to calls
made to residents who have voiced their objection to receiving telephone solicitations. See,
e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-4-405 (Supp. 2001) ("The authority shall establish and provide
for the operation of a database to compile a list of telephone numbers of residential
subscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations."). California goes even farther
toward avoiding overbreadth in that its statute allows consumers to register for the "do-
not-call" list while still allowing certain types of telemarketing calls to be placed to their
number. CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17591(b) (West Supp. 2002) ("A subscriber may exclude
from the coverage of the "do not call" list telephone calls from entities identified by the
subscriber."). Due to this selectivity, "do-not-call" legislation is likely to be viewed with
approval under Central Hudson's fourth prong. See supra note 84 (discussing Central
Hudson's fourth prong).
328 IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.7-1-1.
329 Id.
330 Lysaght v. New Jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646, 649-53 (D.N.J. 1993); Moser v. FCC, 826 F.
Supp. 360, 365-67 (D. Or. 1993).
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government's stated interest in, protecting privacy.331 As a result, both
courts found that the regulations failed Central Hudson's third prong,
thus violating the guarantees of the First Amendment. 332
As previously mentioned, the decisions of the Lysaght court and the
district court in Moser have represented the minority position among
courts reviewing telemarketing legislation.333 Most courts, instead, have
been quite willing to uphold regulation of the telemarketing industry. 334
Some courts, facing the very same question of underinclusiveness, have
found that it is acceptable for the government to solve a portion of the
problems it addresses without completely eliminating them.335
However, times may have changed since the decisions in Moser and
Lysaght were rendered in 1993. Since that time, the pendulum of the
Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence has swung in favor of
the speech.336 A number of recent decisions by the Supreme Court
suggest that the Court itself, or a lower court faithful to its recent
precedents, may well side with the Lysaght and Moser district court's
interpretation of underinclusiveness and its meaning within Central
Hudson.337
In recent opinions, the Court has again emphasized the value of
commercial speech and extended increased protection to it.338 For
331 Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 649-53; Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 365-67.
332 Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 651-52; Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 367. Observe that subsequent to
the completion of this Note, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri used essentially the same third-prong, reasonable-fit analysis described in this
section to declare portions of the TCPA governing unsolicited fax advertisements
unconstitutional. See Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 920, 927-34 (E.D. Mo.
2002).
333 See supra Part III.B-C (reporting federal and state court decisions on the
constitutionality of telemarketing regulations).
334 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
335 Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that Congress was entitled to
proscribe some telemarketing calls with the TCPA without prohibiting all of them);
Minnesota v. Casino Mktg. Group, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Minn. 1992) (holding that "[a]
regulation of commercial speech does not fail to directly advance the state's substantial
interest merely because it does not eradicate all the evils that offend that interest"). But see
infra notes 336-72 and accompanying text (speculating about the future acceptability of
such underinclusiveness).
336 See supra Part II.D (discussing increased protection for commercial speech in recent
Supreme Court decisions).
337 See supra Part II.D.
338 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495-504 (1996) (tracing the
history of the Court's commercial speech doctrine and emphasizing the value of
commercial advertising to state residents); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
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instance, in Discovery Network, the Court was highly critical of the city of
Cincinnati's plan that targeted only commercial newsracks for
elimination from public property. 339 In finding the scheme violative of
the First Amendment, the Court stated that the city had "attach[ed] more
importance to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech than [the Court's] cases warrant[ed] and seriously underestimat[ed]
the value of commercial speech." 340 The continued rigid application of
Central Hudson's third prong by the Court in Rubin, 44 Liquormart, Greater
New Orleans Broadcasting, and Lorillard to invalidate underinclusive or
illogical legislation, signals an ongoing willingness on the part of the
Court to protect commercial speech that is regulated without sufficient
justification. 341  Indeed, in recent years, it has been suggested that
heightened standards of review should apply to certain types of
commercial speech cases.342 Some justices have even openly pondered
whether commercial speech should be less protected than other speech
at all.343 Justice Stevens, for example, concurring in Rubin, observed that
507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (discussing the value of commercial speech). For a discussion of
the Supreme Court's increased protections of commercial speech, see Langvardt, supra note
109, at 587-652.
339 Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 424-28.
340 Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
341 For a discussion of these cases, see supra Part II.D.
342 See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416 n.11; 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501. The Court
observed the following:
[I]f commercial speech is entitled to "lesser protection" only when the
regulation is aimed at either the content of the speech or the particular
adverse effects stemming from that content, it would seem to follow
that a regulation that is not so directed should be evaluated under the
standards applicable to regulations on fully protected speech.
Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416 n.11. The Liquormart Court noted that
The mere fact that messages propose commercial transactions does not
in and of itself dictate the constitutional analysis that should apply ....
[Wihen a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful,
nonmisleading commercial messages . . . there is far less reason to
depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally
demands.
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501.
343 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 431 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (observing that "there is no
reason to treat truthful commercial speech as a class that is less 'valuable' than
noncommercial speech"). Justice Thomas posited that "there is no 'philosophical or
historical basis for asserting that "commercial speech" is of a "lower value" than
"noncommercial" speech' .... Indeed I doubt whether it is even possible to draw a
coherent distinction between [the two]." Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 575.
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economic motivation or impact alone cannot make
speech less deserving of constitutional protection, or else
all authors and artists who sell their works would be
correspondingly disadvantaged. Neither can the value
of speech be diminished solely because of its placement
on the label of a product. Surely a piece of newsworthy
information on the cover of a magazine, or a book
review on the back of a book's dust jacket, is entitled to
full constitutional protection. 344
In light of this increased protection of commercial speech, and
specifically the way in which the Court has interpreted Central Hudson in
recent years, it appears likely that "do-not-call" statutes do not have the
"reasonable fit" required of commercial speech restrictions because their
means are not carefully tailored to advance their ends.345 The routine
344 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,494 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
345 See supra Part II.D (discussing recent United States Supreme Court decisions
interpreting Central Hudson). Other potential constitutional problems beyond the scope of
this Note are raised by "do-not-call" statutes besides First Amendment concerns. Michael
E. Shannon, in his observations of "do-not-call" statutes, notes that at least two other
constitutional questions regarding the statutes have been untested. Shannon, supra note
135, at 413. First, is the question of whether state "do-not-call" laws are in fact preempted
by the TCPA. Id. As previously mentioned, Congress, by including a "savings clause"
within the TCPA, explicitly provided that state statutes that were more restrictive than the
TCPA were not preempted. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. The wording of the
savings clause presents the problem, however, in stating that "nothing in this section or in
the regulations prescribed under this section shall preempt any State law that imposes
more restrictive intrastate requirements or regulations ... " 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1) (2000)
(emphasis added). A strict interpretation of this provision thus allows states to impose
regulations that are more restrictive only on in-state telemarketers calling residents of that
same state. Shannon, supra note 135, at 413-14. The unanswered question, however, is
whether Congress intended to reserve interstate regulatory authority to itself, or whether
the TCPA's "savings clause" impliedly authorizes states to regulate interstate calls. Id. at
414. The second problem noted by Shannon respecting "do-not-call" statutes concerns
Congress' dormant Commerce Clause power. Id. at 414-17. While Congress has been given
the positive authority to regulate commerce among the several states, the Court has
continually held since the mid-nineteenth century that, because the commerce power is an
exclusive grant of power to Congress by the Constitution, it operates on a negative basis to
prevent states from unduly burdening interstate commerce. See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3;
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199-200 (1824) (implying that Congress' commerce
power is exclusive by stating that "when a State proceeds to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, or among the several States, it is exercising the very power that is granted
to Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do"). Therefore,
state laws may be held unconstitutional if they unduly burden interstate commerce, even if
Congress has not enacted legislation in the given area and its commerce power is dormant.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 401. This principle presents a problem for the "do-not-call"
statutes enacted to date as most purport to apply to both intrastate and interstate calls. See,
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exemption of various types of telemarketing calls by state legislatures in
their "do-not-call" statutes, in fact, bears a striking resemblance to the
types of underinclusive governmental schemes struck down in Rubin,
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, and Lorillard.346 Moreover, the
exemptions raise the same type of problem under Central Hudson's third
prong that the challenged government regulations in Discovery Network
and 44 Liquormart presented, that is, failure of the program to directly
e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.7-2-5, 24-4.7-2-10 (West Supp. 2001) (defining the terms
applied in its "do-not-call" statute to apply to those "making telephone sales calls to
consumers located in Indiana whether the telephone sales calls are made from a location in
Indiana or outside Indiana"). Further, if discriminatory intent against out-of-state entities
can be demonstrated on the part of the legislature, strict scrutiny may apply. See Hunt v.
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-54 (1977). Statements made to the
press by Indiana legislators are particularly troubling in this regard. See In Brief Legislature,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 13, 2001 (reporting the comments of Dale Sturtz, a sponsor of
Indiana's "do-not-call" bill, who stated that his "main concern is targeting national
telemarketers"); Wagner, supra note 307, at Al (reporting the statements of another
representative who stated that the exemptions in Indiana's "do-not-call" statute were
"necessary to preserve local trade"). Were a dormant Commerce Clause challenge brought
against such a "do-not-call" statute, it seems likely the statute would be found to be
extraterritorial, and, thus, unconstitutional. Shannon, supra note 135, at 416. Besides these
observations by Shannon, another avenue for attack by the telemarketing industry on state
"do-not-call" statutes may be state constitutions, including equal protection clauses. See
supra note 144 (discussing the application of a state constitution to a telemarketing statute).
It is clear that such a challenge brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution would fail as only rational basis review would apply in the absence of
any suspect classification. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110
(1949) (rejecting an equal protection challenge brought against a statute that prohibited
advertising on all vehicles except business delivery vehicles under rational basis review).
However, given the success similar challenges have experienced under stricter state
constitutions, it is equally clear that state constitutions could have significant implications
in a challenge to a state "do-not-call" statute. See generally Moser v. Frohnmayer, 845 P.2d
1284 (Or. 1993) (invalidating a state telemarketing regulation under the state's equal
protection clause); see also supra note 144 (discussing the Moser opinion).
346 See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 565-66; Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States,
527 U.S. 173, 178-79 (1999); Rubin, 514 U.S. at 486-90. While the Court in these cases does
not expressly refer to the problem identified in the legislative schemes as
underinclusiveness, it does refer to the "irrationality" of the schemes, and it is clear that
allowing some advertising, while prohibiting others, is the heart of the Court's concern
when analyzing the regulations in these cases under Central Hudson's third prong. See
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 565-66; Rubin, 514 U.S. at 488 ("We conclude that [the challenged
regulation] cannot... advance its asserted interest because of the overall irrationality of the
Government's regulatory scheme .... If combating strength wars were the goal, we
assume that Congress would regulate disclosure of alcohol content for the strongest
beverages as well as for the weakest ones.").
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advance the legislative purpose. 347  In considering these decisions, it
seems difficult to fathom how a court might differentiate "do-not-call"
statute exemptions from the invalidated regulations in those cases. For
example, how does a "do-not-call" statute with twenty-five different
exemptions "directly advance" the state's interest in protecting the
privacy of its residents within the meaning of these cases? 348 Exempting
some telemarketing calls from the provisions of "do-not-call" statutes
while applying the laws to others who are similarly situated seems
indistinguishable from Rubin's prohibitions on advertising the alcoholic
strength of beer but not wine on bottle labels.349 Such exemptions are
also similar to the federal prohibitions on gambling advertisements
struck down in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting that, due to their
exemptions, failed to directly advance the government's interest.350 Why
should exemptions in "do-not-call" statutes be viewed any differently
than the Massachusetts regulations at issue in Lorillard that allowed
tobacco advertising above five feet in height in retail stores while
prohibiting any lower placement of the ads? 351 The Court has made clear
in these cases that consistency by government in serving its interests is a
prerequisite to any finding that its interests have been directly
advanced.35 2 Given this continued line of reasoning by the Court under
Central Hudson's third prong, it seems highly probable that a decision
rendered by the Court on the constitutionality of a "do-not-call" statute
filled with exemptions would join the Lysaght and Moser district courts'
view of underinclusiveness.
Despite this recent interpretation of Central Hudson by the Court,
past courts, such as the Ninth Circuit in Moser and the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Casino Marketing, have not identified constitutional
problems with underinclusiveness in other telemarketing regulations.353
347 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504-09; Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 424 (noting that the
distinction in the challenged statute "bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular
interests that the city has asserted"). For discussion of these cases, see supra Part II.D.
3w8 See ALA. CODE § 8-19A-4 (Supp. 2000) (making twenty-five exemptions to its "do-not-
call" statute); see also supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text (discussing the Alabama
statute and its exemptions).
349 For a discussion of Rubin, see supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
350 The Court's opinion in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting is set forth in Part I.D of this
Note. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
351 The Massachusetts regulatory scheme at issue in Lorillard is discussed in Part II.D of
this Note. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
352 See Langvardt, supra note 109, at 642.
353 See supra note 335 (discussing the Ninth Circuit opinion in Moser and the Minnesota
Supreme Court's opinion in Casino Marketing).
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These courts, instead, found it permissible for the government to solve
only a portion of the problems the regulations address, allowing
seemingly incongruent exemptions to be made.354 However, both of
these courts, in determining that underinclusiveness was permitted,
relied on the United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co. 35 5 line of cases for
authority. 356 Edge was decided in 1993, the same year as both Discovery
354 See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
3- 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
356 See Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1995) (directly invoking Edge); Minnesota
v. Casino Mktg. Group, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Minn. 1992) (relying on authority
invoked in Edge). Posadas De Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328
(1986), and Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), provide authority for
the position that underinclusiveness is permissible in commercial speech regulation. See
Arlen W. Langvardt & Eric L. Richards, The Death of Posadas and the Birth of Change in
Commercial Speech Doctrine: Implications of 44 Liquormart, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 483, 511 (1997)
(suggesting Edge and Posadas represented the Court's willingness to accommodate
legislative decisions, weakening the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson); Cox, supra
note 119, at 410 (asserting that Metromedia and Posadas "stand for the proposition that once
the government demonstrates a significant interest, it need not take all possible steps to
protect that interest"). In Metromedia, the Court agreed that the City of San Diego could
ban certain billboards while allowing others. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512. In applying
Central Hudson, the Court found the city had legitimate interests in furthering traffic safety
and aesthetics. Id. at 507. Applying the third prong, the Court held that
underinclusiveness was permissible and that the city was free to believe that some
billboards presented a more acute problem than others. Id. at 511. In Posadas, the Court
held that the Puerto Rican government had a legitimate interest in discouraging gambling
and could do so through underinclusive means. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341-42. The Court
held that a ban on casino gambling advertising directly advanced the government's interest
in reducing gambling, even though advertising of other forms of gambling was permitted
by applying the Metromedia rationale. Id. at 342. The Posadas Court went even farther in its
legislative deference by holding that the government could freely restrict the advertising of
a practice it could legally prohibit altogether under a "greater power includes the lesser"
rationale. Id. at 345-46. Finally, the Court, in Edge, considered federal statutes that
prohibited the radio broadcast of lottery advertising by licensees located in non-lottery
states and held that such a scheme did not violate Central Hudson. Edge, 509 U.S. at 422-23,
436. The broadcasting entity, Edge, was located on the border of North Carolina, a non-
lottery state, and Virginia, a lottery state. Id. at 423. Edge was prevented from advertising
Virginia's lottery under the law because the station itself was located in North Carolina,
even though ninety percent of its listening audience was in Virginia. Id. at 423-24.
Applying Central Hudson, the Court held that the government had a substantial interest in
supporting the policies of non-lottery states. Id. at 426. Moving on to the third prong, the
Court rejected the finding of the lower court that the regulation did not directly advance
the government interest because the state residents within Edge's broadcast range were
already receiving advertisements from across state lines for the same lottery and, thus, the
regulation was ineffective. Id. at 427-28. Relying heavily on Posadas, the Court held that
the third prong of Central Hudson was not offended by the lack of effect the regulation
would have on the residents near state lines, explicitly approving the underinclusiveness of
the regulation to address out-of-state advertising. Id. at 434 ("Nor do we require that the
Government make progress on every front before it can make progress on any front ....
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Network and Edenfield v. Fane,357 two decisions that rigidly applied the
third prong of Central Hudson.358 Edge, on the other hand, applied both
the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson in a manner much more
deferential to governmental regulatory prerogatives without attempting
to distinguish, in any meaningful fashion, the Discovery Network or
Edenfield opinions decided earlier that year.3 59 In upholding a federal
statute that banned broadcast advertising of state lotteries unless the
broadcaster was located in a state where a lottery was permitted, the
Edge Court expressly allowed underinclusiveness. 360  The Court,
invoking Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico361
as authority, specifically stated that the government need not "make
progress on every front before it can make progress on any front."362
Both the Ninth Circuit in Moser and the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Casino Marketing relied on this reasoning.363
Government may be said to advance its purpose by substantially reducing lottery
advertising, even where it is not wholly eradicated."). The Multimedia, Posadas, and Edge
line of cases have fallen out of favor in recent Court opinions, with the Court expressly
disavowing the reasoning of these cases in some instances. See infra notes 364-372 and
accompanying text.
357 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
35 Id. at 770-73; Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424 (1993). Edenfield
provides another example of the Court's rigid application of Central Hudson's third prong.
Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-73. In Edenfield, a First Amendment challenge was brought against
a Florida Board of Accountancy regulation that prohibited certain public accountants from
engaging in the personal solicitation of potential clients. Id. at 763-64. The state attempted
to justify this ban on advertising by suggesting that its purpose in adopting the measure
was to protect consumers from fraudulent behavior by accountants and to maintain the fact
and appearance of accountant independence in auditing and attesting to financial
statements. Id. at 768. The Court acknowledged the legitimacy of these interests. Id. at
769-70. However, an eight-justice majority held that the state had failed to prove Central
Hudson's third element: the advertising ban's direct advancement of the state interest. Id.
at 771-73 (citing the lack of any studies or any anecdotal evidence that would suggest the
state ban advanced its interests). The Edenfield Court also suggested that analysis would
not be substantially different under a time, place, or manner analysis in that the challenged
restriction "still must serve a substantial state interest in 'a direct and effective way."' Id. at
773 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989)).
359 P. Cameron De Vore, The Two Faces of Commercial Speech Under the First Amendment, 12
COMM. LAW. 1 (Spring 1994). De Vore asserts that the Court's 1993 commercial speech
cases were highly incongruent. Id. Discovery Network and Edenfield on the one hand
"strongly reaffirmed the high value of commercial speech," while Edge demonstrated an
unusual willingness to accommodate legislative judgments. Id.
3W Edge, 509 U.S. at 434.
361 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
362 Id.; see also supra note 356.
363 See supra note 335 (discussing the Moser and Casino Mktg. courts' reasoning).
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Simply stated, the Edge decision, although not expressly overruled,
has not stood the test of time and has been all but abandoned by the
Court in recent decisions.364 The Edge opinion, which relied on a strange
blend of partial concurrences to achieve its result, is viewed as an
anomaly, especially in light of the Discovery Network and Edenfield
opinions.365 The result in Edge has come to be understood as the result of
a unique factual situation in which the Court was responding to
federalism concems. 366 The Edge decision seems even more anomalistic
in light of Rubin's resurrection of Edenfield's interpretation of Central
Hudson's third prong in an eight-to-one decision two years later.367
Furthermore, the Court specifically rejected an attempt by Rhode Island
to rely on Posadas and Edge in an appeal for deference to its decision to
ban liquor advertising in 44 Liquormart.368 The Court instead suggested
that "unquestioningly accepting legislative judgments bordered on
abdication of the Court's role in resolving constitutional questions" and
refused to "give force to its highly deferential approach." 369 Finally, the
Posadas decision itself, which had been relied on in Edge, was expressly
abandoned by the Court in 44 Liquormart.370 In 44 Liquormart, the Court
openly stated that Posadas had "erroneously performed the First
Amendment analysis" and could not be reconciled with the Court's
commercial speech precedents. 371 In light of the foregoing discussion,
and the Court's repeated invocation of the Edenfield standard for Central
364 See Langvardt & Richards, supra note 356, at 513 n.152; see also infra notes 365-72 and
accompanying text. The Edge decision was mentioned by the Court in one recent decision,
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999). However, this
was due to the fact that the same statute challenged in Edge was again at issue in Greater
New Orleans Broadcasting. Greater New Orleans Broad., 527 U.S. at 176. Further, the Court in
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting "pointedly refused to engage in Edge Broadcasting-like
tolerance for government restrictions on commercial speech, despite the existence of a
plausible argument that Edge Broadcasting should control." Langvardt, supra note 109, at
640.
365 De Vore, supra note 359, at 23-24.
366 Id. at 26-27 (explaining that Edge's unusual fact situation and federalism concerns
distinguish that case from the Court's mainstream line of commercial speech cases).
367 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1995); Langvardt & Richards,
supra note 356, at 513. In Rubin, the Court directly implied that the result in Edge had been
produced by federalism concerns. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 486 (noting that the government
officials in that case were not in need of federal assistance as were the states in Edge).
368 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 508-10 (1996).
369 Id. at 510; Langvardt & Richards, supra note 356, at 539.
370 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 509 (stating that the Posadas opinion "cannot be reconciled
with the unbroken line of prior cases"); Langvardt & Richards, supra note 356, at 538
(suggesting that the 44 Liquormart majority opinion's "careful dismantling of Posadas leaves
virtually no life in that decision").
371 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 509.
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Hudson's third prong in its recent commercial speech cases, it appears
likely that underinclusiveness in "do-not-call" statutes will not be well
received in future decisions.372
2. Evidentiary Difficulties for States Defending "Do-Not-Call" Statutes
When a First Amendment challenge is brought against a "do-not-
call" statute, evidentiary concerns regarding the statutory exemptions
also become apparent in light of the Supreme Court's recent precedents.
These cases make clear that the government should demonstrate that it is
aware of its intrusion on speech and that it has "carefully calculated the
costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its
prohibition."373 The precedents also place the burden squarely on the
government to demonstrate that its regulation achieves the "reasonable
fit" requirement of Central Hudson.374  The Court described this
obligation in detail in Edenfleld, where it observed that "[t]his burden is
not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental
body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree."375 In the years since Edenfield was
decided, the Court, in its recent commercial speech cases, has not
retreated from this demand, but rather has continued to require such a
showing from governmental bodies seeking to restrain commercial
speech.376 In these cases, the Court continues to look for substantial
evidence from the government that its regulations will in fact directly
advance the government's interest.377  Mere "anecdotal evidence,"
"educated guesses," and other "tidbits" have been held to be
insufficient.378 Rather, the Court has made clear that the government
372 For a discussion of the Court's invocation of Edenfield, see infra Part IV.D.2.
373 Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993).
374 Id. at 416; Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (finding that, "since the State
bears the burden of justifying its restrictions, ... it must affirmatively establish the
reasonable fit we require") (citation omitted).
375 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993) (emphasis added). "Without this
requirement [the Court observed], a State could with ease restrict commercial speech in the
service of other objectives that could not themselves justify a burden on commercial
expression." Id. at 771. The Court in Edenfield found that the government in that case had
not presented any studies or statistical evidence that would substantiate that the state
interest was directly advanced by the advertising ban at issue. Id.
376 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 566 (2001); 44 Liquormart, 517
U.S. at 505; Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) (referring to this showing
by government as being "critical" in the Central Hudson analysis).
377 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505; Rubin, 514 U.S. at 487-89.
378 Rubin, 514 U.S. at 490.
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should present studies, findings of fact, or other similarly persuasive
evidence to establish the ability of a regulation to directly and
significantly advance the government's asserted interest. 379
A clear example of this need for evidentiary support is provided in
44 Liquormart where the government, in support of its ban on alcohol
price advertising, asked the Court to accept the "common sense" notion
that such a prohibition would ultimately lead to higher alcohol prices
and, thus, impact the purchasing patterns of state residents.380 While the
Court agreed with this proposition in the abstract, it held that such a lack
of evidence would still not support a finding that the prohibition on
advertising would significantly reduce alcohol consumption in the state
as required by Central Hudson.381 Rather, the Court was looking for the
state to provide findings that would identify the price level at which
significant reductions in alcohol consumption would occur and what
level of decrease in price would occur if the ban was not in place.382 The
Court stated that, without such information provided by the state, it
would have to engage in "speculation or conjecture," which it viewed as
an "unacceptable means of demonstrating that a restriction on
commercial speech directly advances the State's interest." 383
State interests faired much better in Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc.,38 4
where regulations of the Florida Bar Association prohibiting certain
direct-mail solicitations of personal injury victims were challenged. 3 5 In
applying Central Hudson in that case, the Court observed that the
government's asserted interest in protecting the privacy of personal
injury victims and their families against unsolicited contact by lawyers
379 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505-06 (citing a lack of findings, or evidentiary support
whatsoever, for the state's claim that its speech prohibition would reduce statewide alcohol
consumption in any significant fashion); Rubin, 514 U.S. at 489 (finding that no credible
evidence had been brought forward by the government to support its ban on advertising
alcoholic content on beer labels and suggesting that evidence to the contrary existed).
380 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505.
38 Id. In fact, despite the prohibition on alcohol advertising having been in place for
nearly forty years, one study indicated that Rhode Island was among the top thirty percent
of all states in per capita consumption of alcoholic beverages. Id. at 493.
382 Id. at 506-07.
383 Id. at 507.
- 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
35 Id. The challenged regulations prohibited personal injury attorneys from sending
targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims of accidents or disasters or their family
members for a thirty-day period following the incident. Id. at 620. The regulations were
challenged by Went For It, Inc., a lawyer referral service, as a violation of both the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 621.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2002], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss1/6
2002] "DO-NOT-CALL" 415
was substantial. 386 Moving on to the third prong, the Court, citing a
detailed one-hundred-and-six page summary of a two-year study
conducted by the state bar, found that the regulation directly advanced
the government's interest.387 Standing in stark contrast to the lack of
evidence presented by Rhode Island in 44 Liquormart, the Court found
the Florida Bar's evidentiary record "noteworthy" and quoted the results
from the survey at length in its second-prong analysis.388
This demand for evidentiary support of restrictions on commercial
speech would seem to present difficulty for states that have enacted "do-
not-call" laws to date. While a few "do-not-call" statutes contain
legislative findings that would assist a court in determining the
government's interest or purpose in enacting the statute, only one statute
attempts in any way to explain its exemptions.389  As previously
386 Id. at 624-25. This interest was found to be part of a larger government interest in
"curbing activities that negatively affect the administration of justice." Id. at 624.
387 Id. at 628. The Florida Bar's survey indicated that approximately 700,000 direct-mail
solicitations were mailed annually by Florida attorneys. Id. at 626. Approximately forty
percent of these solicitations were mailed to accident victims or their survivors. Id. A
survey of state residents concerning these solicitations was commissioned by the Florida
Bar. Id. Fifty-four percent of those surveyed found the solicitation practice to violate
privacy rights. Id. at 627. Forty-five percent of a random sampling of those who had
received direct mail solicitations from attorneys found the tactics were designed to take
advantage of unstable or gullible persons. Id. Twenty-seven percent of these persons
found that the solicitations lowered their regard for the legal profession. Id.
388 Id. at 626-29.
389 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19C-1 (Supp. 2001). The ordinance states:
The Legislature of Alabama finds all of the following:
(1) The use of the telephone to market goods and services to the home
is pervasive now due to the increased use of cost-effective
telemarketing techniques.
(2) Over 30,000 businesses actively telemarket goods and services to
businesses and residential customers.
(3) Everyday, over 300,000 solicitors place calls to more than 18 million
Americans, including citizens of this state.
(4) Telemarketing, however, can be an intrusive and relentless invasion
of the privacy and peacefulness of the home.
(5) Many citizens of this state are outraged over the proliferation of
nuisance calls to their homes from telemarketers.
(6) Privacy rights and commercial freedom of speech of individuals
can be balanced in a way that accommodates both the privacy of
individuals and legitimate telemarketing practices.
(7) It is in the public interest to establish a mechanism under which the
individual citizens of this state can decide whether or not to receive
telemarketing calls in their homes.
Id. These findings are identical to the findings in the Georgia statute. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-
5-27(a) (Supp. 2001). Another state to include findings, including a finding regarding
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mentioned, exemptions to "do-not-call" statutes are primarily a result of
lobbying of state legislatures rather than part of some conscious choice
by representatives to apply the statute only to the telemarketers
representing the greatest intrusion into residents' homes.390 However,
there may be some indication that state representatives also consider the
relative threat to privacy posed by those exempted when adopting "do-
not-call" statutes. For instance, Representative Dale Sturtz, the sponsor
of the Indiana "do-not-call" bill that was ultimately enacted, candidly
admits that the primary reason for the exemptions contained in Indiana's
law was the pressure put on state representatives by the real estate,
insurance, and newspaper lobbies.3 91 However, Representative Sturtz
also indicated that the consensus among state representatives who
eventually voted for the bill was that those who would receive
exemptions did not make a significant percentage of telemarketing calls
to state residents.392 Therefore, the legislators felt that the bill would still
apply to those large telemarketing companies representing the greatest
invasion of consumers' privacy.393
While such concern for privacy is refreshing, it is clear, in light of the
foregoing discussion, that appeals to such common sense considerations
exemptions for charitable organizations or political speech, is Colorado. See COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 6-1-902 (West Supp. 2002). The Colorado statute provides the following
findings:
(1) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that:
(a) The use of the telephone and telefacsimile ("fax") to market goods
and services is widespread;
(b) Many citizens of this state view telemarketing as an invasion of
privacy;
(c) Individuals' privacy rights and commercial freedom of speech
should be balanced in a way that accommodates both the privacy of
individuals and legitimate telemarketing practices;
(d) Although charitable and political organizations are exempt from
the provisions of this part 9 because of considerations of freedom of
speech, the general assembly encourages such organizations to
voluntarily comply with this part 9 when possible; and
(e) It is in the public interest to establish a mechanism under which the
individual citizens of this state can decide whether or not to receive
telephone solicitations by phone or fax.
Id. Section 6-1-902(1)(d) represents an attempt to explain an exemption in the statute. Id.
§ 6-1-902(1)(d).
39 See supra notes 290-91 and 323 and accompanying text.
391 See supra note 323 (reporting comments made by Rep. Sturtz concerning the
exemptions).
392 Sturtz interview, supra note 306.
393 Id.
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will not suffice to demonstrate Central Hudson's "reasonable fit." Were a
First Amendment challenge brought against a statute such as Indiana's,
where legislative consideration of privacy concerns presented by
exemptions went unexpressed, the result would likely be similar to that
in 44 Liquormart.394 Rather than accepting appeals to common sense, a
reviewing court remaining true to the Court's recent precedents would
instead be looking for a more concrete expression of the state's privacy
concerns. 395 Such a court would likely expect evidence supporting the
state's conclusions regarding the privacy threat posed by those exempted
in the form of studies, surveys, or findings.396 Were such studies
conducted by a state enacting a "do-not-call" statute with exemptions,
they may well be sufficient to bring the statute within Central Hudson's
"reasonable fit." After all, the "fit" need not be perfect to survive review
under Central Hudson but merely "reasonable." 397 However, without
such evidentiary support for the exemptions placed within "do-not-call"
statutes, those enacted to date are clearly threatened by the "reasonable
fit" requirement.398
V. A MODEL "Do-NOT-CALL" STATUTE
In the absence of any new federal efforts to restrict telemarketing, it
appears that "do-not-call" statutes will continue their present popularity
with state legislatures. 399 Those states that have not already enacted a
"do-not-call" statute are likely already considering a "do-not-call" bill in
some form or another.400 If not, they surely will be forced to consider
such a measure in the near future due to overwhelming public demand
for the laws. Those states that have not already enacted "do-not-call"
laws can make use of the provisions of some presently existing laws that
reflect legislative attention having been paid to the problems
surrounding such a statute. They should, however, also pay close
attention to the Supreme Court's recent interpretations of Central Hudson
and attempt to draft statutes that are more likely to survive a searching
394 See supra text accompanying notes 380-83 (discussing the 44 Liquormart decision).
395 See supra text accompanying notes 373-79.
396 See supra text accompanying notes 373-79.
397 Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); see also supra note 152 (discussing the
"reasonable fit" requirement).
398 See supra text accomanying notes 380-83.
399 See supra note 246 (discussing the possibility of a federal "do-not-call" statute); supra
notes 251-73 and accompanying text (discussing the popularity of state "do-not-call"
statutes).
400 See supra note 270 and accompanying text (listing the web sites of several state
legislatures presently considering "do-not-call" bills).
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"reasonable fit" analysis.401 States that have already enacted "do-not-
call" statutes should also consider reviewing their statutes and
amending them in such a way as to comply more closely with the
increasing demands of legislation that burdens commercial speech.402
The following model statute offers a starting point for drafting a
"do-not-call" statute that is likely to survive a Central Hudson analysis,
thus avoiding invalidation of the statute on First Amendment
grounds.40 3 It incorporates the provisions of several state "do-not-call"
statutes that reflect obvious effort on the part of legislatures to address
the needs of both consumers and telemarketers raised by this form of
advertising and the prohibitions placed upon it.4°4
Title: Business and Commercial Code
Chapter: State Telephone Privacy Act
Section 1: Legislative Findings
(a) The Legislature finds that:
(1) The use of the telephone to market goods and
services to the home has become a widespread and
pervasive practice due to the increased use of cost-
effective telemarketing techniques. 405
(2) Over 30,000 businesses in the United States actively
telemarket goods and services to residential
consumers.
406
401 See supra Part IV.D.1 (analyzing underinclusiveness in telemarketing regulations in
light of recent Supreme Court precedents).
402 See supra Part IV.D.1.
403 It should be mentioned that several sections of the typical "do-not-call" statute,
beyond the scope of this Note, yet necessary for its complete implementation, have been
excluded from the model statute. Such sections include remedies, funding, and reporting
requirements among others. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.7-3-5, 24-4.7-3-6, 24-4.7-5-2
(West Supp. 2001).
404 The statutory provisions cited within this model statute have been set forth in whole
or in part as they appear in their respective state codes. See infra notes 405-11, 413-18, 422-
26 and accompanying text. To date, no state "do-not-call" statute contains the specific
provisions contained within this model statute.
405 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-27(a)(1) (Supp. 2001).
406 See id. § 46-5-27(a)(2).
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(3) Each day, over 1 million telemarketing calls are
placed to citizens of this state.407
(4) Unrestricted telemarketing represents a threat to the
privacy of the citizens of this state.40 8
(5) Many citizens of this state are outraged over the
proliferation of intrusive calls to their homes from
telemarketers, consider such calls to be a nuisance, and
have requested that their representatives address this
problem.4°9
(6) The proliferation of unsolicited telemarketing sales
calls, especially during the evening hours, creates a
disturbance upon the home and family life of the
citizens of this state.410
(7) Some consumers maintain telephone service
primarily for emergency situations, and unrestricted
placement of telemarketing calls to these consumers may
create a health and safety risk to those consumers.411
(8) Telemarketing has been used successfully as a
method of perpetrating fraud on the citizens of this state,
particularly targeting the state's senior citizens.412
(9) There is a compelling state interest in protecting the
privacy of the citizens of this state who wish to avoid
unsolicited telemarketing sales calls.413
407 See generally ALA. CODE § 8-19C-1(3) (Supp. 2001). The number of phone calls in this
example is hypothetical. In order to demonstrate compliance with Central Hudson's third
prong, it would benefit each state to conduct its own survey of the threat to privacy posed
by telemarketing to its residents. See supra Part LV.D.2 (discussing Central Hudson's
evidentiary demands).
408 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-99-402(a)(2) (Michie 2001).
409 See id. § 4-99-402(a)(3). It would be beneficial if state representatives, prior to voting
on "do-not-call" legislation, kept track of public opinion of such a statute in order to give
meaning to this provision.
410 Id. § 4-99-402(a)(4).
411 Id. § 4-99-402(a)(5).
412 See Minnesota v. Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d 882, 887-88 (Minn. 1992)
(recognizing fraud prevention as a legitimate and substantial state interest under Central
Hudson).
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(10) It is in the public interest to establish a mechanism
under which the individual citizens of this state can
decide whether or not to receive unsolicited
telemarketing sales calls in their homes, just as they may
already lawfully decide whether to receive solicitations
at their door.414
(11) The privacy rights of the citizens of this state and
the commercial freedom of speech rights of those using
telemarketing sales techniques as well as those of
citizens who wish to receive telemarketing calls must be
balanced in a way that protects both privacy and
legitimate telemarketing practices. 415
(12) The establishment of a "do-not-call" list, by which
consumers who choose to receive no telemarketing calls
can express their choice while permitting telemarketers
to call consumers who do not object to such calls, is the
means of protecting consumers that is least restrictive of
commercial speech interests.
(13) Although some consumers enjoy and may benefit
from receiving unsolicited telemarketing sales calls,
others who are bothered by such sales practices are
unlikely to respond affirmatively to receiving such calls.
Thus, telemarketers have no further legitimate interest in
continuing to invade the privacy of those consumers
who affirmatively express their objections to such
calls.4
16
(14) Legitimate telemarketers can make their
telemarketing efforts more cost-effective by avoiding
calling those consumers who have expressed their
objections to receiving such calls.417
(15) The Legislature intends that this chapter protect the
privacy of state telephone consumers who have
413 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17590(a) (West Supp. 2002).
414 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-27(a)(7) (Supp. 2001).
415 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-99-402(a)(6).
416 See id. § 4-99-402(a)(7).
417 Id.
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affirmatively expressed an objection to receiving
unsolicited telemarketing sales calls, and the Legislature
intends that this chapter be liberally construed to effect
that goal. 418
Commentary
The primary purpose of section one is to establish the government's
purpose in enacting the statute. Should a First Amendment challenge be
brought against the statute, it is here that a court will look to determine
whether the state has articulated a substantial interest within the
meaning of Central Hudson. The findings first attempt to define the scope
of the problem the state is attempting to address and announce that the
problems presented by telemarketing affect the state's residents. Several
of the findings then announce that the state is attempting to protect the
privacy of its citizens. Fraud and safety concerns, which are secondary
interests, are also articulated by the findings.
These findings further announce to a reviewing court that the
legislature was mindful of First Amendment considerations when
drafting the statute and that the legislature has attempted to balance the
important interests of privacy and commercial freedom of speech.419 The
findings recognize, not only the commercial speech rights of the
telemarketers, but also those of state residents who might wish to receive
telemarketing calls. Besides announcing interests required under the
second prong of Central Hudson, the findings also offer some support for
other prongs of the test. The findings demonstrate that the state is
attempting, through the least restrictive means possible, to protect the
privacy of those citizens who are bothered by telemarketing calls, while
allowing telemarketers to continue calling all other telephone consumers
in the state. 420 The third prong is given limited support by findings that
demonstrate that the state has investigated the extent to which
telemarketing is utilized in the state before adopting the statute, thus
418 Id. § 4-99-402(b).
419 See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993) (observing that
government, in restricting commercial speech, must demonstrate that it has "carefully
calculated the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its
prohibition").
420 See supra note 84 (discussing the least restrictive means requirement of Central
Hudson).
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providing valuable evidentiary support that the statute will directly
advance the state's goal.421
Section 2: Definitions
(a) As used in this chapter:
(1) "Division" refers to the Consumer Protection
Division of the Attorney General's Office. 422
(2) "List" refers to the no telemarketing sales call list
maintained and published by the Division under Section
3 to which consumers may have their names and
telephone numbers added to voice their objection to
receiving unsolicited telemarketing sales calls and thus
bring themselves within the protections of this
chapter.423
(3) "Consumer" means a residential telephone
subscriber in this state or any other persons residing in
the same residence as the subscriber. 424
(4) "Telemarketer" means any person or corporation
who makes an unsolicited telemarketing sales call to a
consumer or any person who directly supervises the
conduct of the telemarketer.425
(5) "Unsolicited telemarketing sales call" means:
(i) Soliciting a sale of consumer goods or services,
offering an investment, business, or employment
421 See supra Part IV.D.2 (discussing the evidentiary requirements of Central Hudson's
third prong). Demonstrating the governmental interest in enacting a "do-not-call" statute
will be difficult for those states that do not make legislative findings or record legislative
history. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1991) (observing that it "is
impossible to discern, other than from the text of the statute, exactly what governmental
interest the Indiana legislators had in mind when they enacted [the public indecency]
statute, for Indiana does not record legislative history"). States that do not clearly state
their purpose or interest in enacting legislation leave the finding of such an interest to the
reviewing court. See id.
422 IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.7-2-4 (West Supp. 2002).
42 See id. § 24-4.7-2-7.
424 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.1095(2) (West 2001).
425 See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 399-z(1)(g) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
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opportunity, or offering a consumer loan to the
consumer called;
(ii) Obtaining information that will or may be used for
the solicitation of a sale of consumer goods or services,
the offering of an investment, business, or employment
opportunity, or the offering of a consumer loan to the
consumer called;
(iii) Offering the consumer called a prize, gift, or
anything else of value, if payment of money or other
consideration is required in order to receive the prize or
gift, including, but not limited to, the purchasing of
other merchandise or services or the payment of any
processing fees, delivery, shipping and handling, or any
other fees or charges; or
(iv) Offering the consumer called a prize, gift, or other
incentive to attend a sales presentation for consumer
goods or services, an investment or business
opportunity, or a consumer loan, or property;
(v) "Unsolicited telemarketing sales call" does not
include any telephone call made in response to the
express written request of the consumer. 426
Commentary
Section two sets forth the essential terms used in the "do-not-call"
statute. The primary importance of this section is its noticeable lack of
exemptions. As opposed to numerous existing "do-not-call" statutes,
this section has not been used to define telemarketing to exclude several
types of business calls to consumers.427 By eliminating the exemptions to
the statute, the legislature following this model avoids potential First
Amendment problems. As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court in
recent years has rigidly interpreted the third prong of the Central Hudson
test for commercial speech restrictions. 428 Recent precedents in this area
suggest that the Court, or a lower court carefully reading its opinions,
426 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.46951(1)(a) (Banks-Baldwin 2002).
427 See supra Part IV.B (discussing exemptions placed within the "do-not-call" statutes of
several states).
428 See supra Part IV.D.
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will examine a commercial speech restriction to ensure that the statute's
means are carefully tailored to advance its ends. Drafting a "do-not-call"
statute with exemptions dramatically increases the likelihood that no
"reasonable fit" will be found between the government's means and end,
requiring the statute to be invalidated.429
The one exemption contained within the model statute, allowing
calls to which the consumer expressly consents, provides protection for
calls that are unobjectionable to the consumer and protects the statute
from a finding of overbreadth. A provision such as this may also be
used to protect existing business interests rather than including an
additional "pre-existing business relationship" exception that would
present difficulties in interpretation, likely subjecting the consumer to
many unwanted calls. 430 Under the model statute exemption, creditors
could require debtors to consent in writing to such calls, and businesses
with which the consumer frequently has dealings could similarly request
permission to contact the consumer. This exemption places the
consumer, not the telemarketer, in charge of which calls may be placed,
making the statute more carefully tailored to protect privacy interests
while not proscribing speech to which there is no objection.
Section 3: Establishment and Maintenance of No
Telemarketing Sales Call List
(a) The Division shall establish and operate a database to
compile a list of telephone numbers of consumers who
429 See supra Part IV.D. Due to extensive lobbying efforts by various business entities,
legislators are often forced to place exemptions within "do-not-call" statutes. See supra
notes 290-91 and accompanying text. However, legislators may ultimately agree to the
exemptions due to a perception that the exempted parties are not responsible for a
significant percentage of telemarketing calls received by their state's telephone consumers.
See supra text accompanying notes 392-93 (describing events leading to the passage of
Indiana's "do-not-call" statute). Such a scenario presents a slightly different opportunity
for legislators to demonstrate the "reasonable fit" of their statute. To comply with the
evidentiary requirements described in Part IV.D.2, the legislature of such a state should
conduct a study of all telemarketing calls received by state telephone consumers and
determine the percentage of calls placed by parties that would be exempt under the statute.
See supra Part IV.D.2 (discussing evidentiary requirements under Central Hudson's third
prong). An additional finding could then be added to the effect that the exempted calls
represent, for example, less than two percent of all telemarketing calls received by
consumers. Given the Supreme Court's often repeated holding that the "fit" under the
third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson need not be perfect, but only "reasonable," such
a finding may permit the statute to survive judicial review. See supra note 152.
430 See supra note 288 (discussing the "pre-existing" business relationship exemption).
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object to receiving unsolicited telemarketing sales calls.
The Division shall begin compiling this list upon the
passage of this Act and shall have the database in
operation before July 1, 2003.431
(b) Any consumer who wishes to be placed on the list
shall notify the Division either by calling a toll-free
number established by the Division for this purpose or
by registering on the attorney general's website if such
registration is authorized by the attorney general.
Registration on the list will be without charge to the
consumer.
432
(c) The Division will publish, at least quarterly, an
updated version of the list to be distributed to
telemarketers seeking to place unsolicited telemarketing
sales calls in the state. The list will be distributed to
these telemarketers at a fee not greater than necessary to
provide for publication costs of the list.
(d) The Division will establish methods whereby
additional consumers may indicate their desire to be
included on the next quarterly publication of the list.
(e) The Division will establish a procedure whereby
those already on the list and who wish to have their
numbers removed may do so.
(f) A consumer may exclude from the coverage of the list
telemarketing sales calls from entities identified by the
consumer. The consumer shall designate any exclusions
in the manner prescribed by the Division.433
(g) If the federal government establishes a single,
unified, national database of telephone numbers of
consumers who object to receiving unsolicited
telemarketing sales calls, the Division shall provide the
431 See ALA. CODE § 8-19C2(b)(1) (Supp. 2001).
432 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-288a(b) (West Supp. 2002).
433 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17591(b) (West Supp. 2002).
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state's list to the federal government for inclusion in the
federal "do-not-call" database. 434
Commentary
Section three is essential to the establishment and maintenance of the
state's "do-not-call" list and is the section through which legislatures set
the list in motion. This section contemplates that the attorney general's
office will be placed in charge of establishing and overseeing the
database which is often, but not always, the case in "do-not-call" statutes
enacted to date. The primary importance of this section, besides
describing the operation of the database, is its attempt to restrict only
that speech which the consumer objects to and no more. The section
provides for an ongoing registration process for consumers who wish to
be added to the database and allows those who wish to be removed from
the list to have their numbers deleted. One important feature of this
section, which so far has only been included in the California "do-not-
call" statute, is found in section 3(f). This provision allows consumers to
be placed on the list yet allows, in advance, certain types of
telemarketing calls or calls from specific telemarketers. Some states, in
placing charitable organization exemptions within "do-not-call" statutes,
may have done so in the belief that these types of calls are
unobjectionable to most consumers. This provision, instead, allows each
individual consumer to make this decision, allowing a more careful
tailoring of the statute's prohibitions on speech.
Section 4: Unlawful Unsolicited Telemarketing Sales Calls
No telemarketer shall make or cause to be made any
unsolicited telemarketing sales call to any consumer
whose number appears on the then-current quarterly list
published by the Division.435
434 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.1101(3) (West Supp. 2001). Such a provision would
enable an easier transition to a federal database should a national "do-not-call" list be
established by the federal government. See supra note, 246 (discussing the possibility of a
national database).
435 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.7-4-1 (West Supp. 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.059(4)
(West Supp. 2002).




Section four is the essence of any "do-not-call" statute-the statement
of the prohibition on calls to consumers on the list. This section is very
straightforward and does not dilute the strength of its protections with




In responding to the increased use of telemarketing techniques to
market goods and services, state legislatures are faced with the same
types of problems posed by door-to-door solicitations at the time Breard
was decided. 437 Legislative efforts to regulate telemarketing are merely
the modem equivalent of the ordinances that were enacted by the same
state legislatures in response to that earlier advertising problem. Like
legislation directed against door-to-door solicitation in the early part of
the twentieth century, legislation aimed at controlling the telemarketing
industry has, to this point, enjoyed broad support in the courts.438
However, courts and legislators must not lose sight of the fact that
telemarketing, though intrusive, is still speech and is afforded
constitutional protection. Certainly the Supreme Court, though
wavering in its protections of commercial speech, has not lost sight of
this simple truth. The Court has clearly signaled, through its recent
rigorous application of Central Hudson, that restrictions on commercial
speech must not be lightly undertaken. Instead, such restrictions must
represent a carefully calculated, logically applied, and clearly
supportable governmental effort to balance the need for the regulations
with the protections afforded commercial speech. This message being
sent by the Court spells trouble for "do-not-call" statutes as they have
been enacted to date. By including exemptions in their statutes in such a
cavalier fashion, state legislatures have not only afforded less protection
to those on "do-not-call" lists than consumers desire and expect but
436 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.059(4).
437 See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (discussing Breard and the problems
presented by door-to-door solicitation). Note that section 3 of the ordinance at issue in
Breard prohibiting door-to-door sales in Alexandria, Louisiana, also contained an
exemption for (presumably) local sellers of produce. See supra note 43.
438 See supra Part III.B-C.
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appear also to have ignored the Court's increased protection of
commercial speech, placing the laws at risk of invalidation.
Steven R. Probst*
This Note is dedicated to the memory of the author's mother, Judith S. (Hamann)
Probst, who died shortly after the Note's completion. Without her constant support, and
the example of courage she provided daily, this Note would not have been possible.
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